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The following paper investigates the current paradigm for economic development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Following a review of recent literature in international political 
economy, the author argues the present system is a result of national self-interest in the 
North, rather than being the best program for development in the South. A critical 
analysis of the popular Washington Consensus strategy is provided. The author contends 
these policies underutilize recent advances in the theory of economic development as 
well as international political economy. 
Empirical data is used throughout the paper to support the argument. While most 
of the data comes from leading researchers in the field, a portion is based on primary 
research into the statements and documents of government officials, international 
organizations, and non-governmental entities. A case study is used to illustrate the 
benefits of new theories for growth, as well as to identify the critical determinants of 
economic development. 
The author concludes that reforms are needed to improve the economic, political 
and social development of Sub-Saharan Africa. Policies would improve by properly 
pacing and sequencing the macroeconomic reforms of the Washington Consensus, 
building national unity and domestic institutions, focusing on productivity growth and 
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THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DEVELOPMENT 
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
After fifty years and nearly $1 trillion in finance, the record of development 
initiatives throughout the world is mixed, at best. Development programs, often tied 
to extensive aid packages from international donors or finance organizations, have 
shown little success, despite the massive effort In Africa alone there are an estimated 
50,000 to 100,000 foreign experts involved in development activities.) And yet, 
between the early 1960s and the late 1980s there was no growth in average per capita 
income for the continent. 2 
With nearly 45% ofthe world's population (2.8 billion people) living on less 
than $2 a day and the division between rich and poor countries growing every day, it 
is hard to think of a more pressing issue in international political economy than 
developmental economics. It spans every major arena of interstate relations: security, 
economic prosperity (for both the developed and developing countries), diplomacy, 
cultural enrichment, and human development. 
Despite its importance, however, developmental economics has produced few 
answers and many questions in the last fifty years. One of the only answers we have, 
in fact, is that what has been tried so far has not been working. 3 
After all the attention, hard work and investment, Sub-Saharan Africa, by far 
the poorest region in the world and the focus of this paper, is worse off today than it 
was forty years ago. The region remains isolated from the globalizing economy. 
During the 1990s, it accounted for less than 1 % of world trade, despite having 
I Benno Ndulu, Nicolas van de Walle and contributors, Agenda/or Africa's Economic Renewal 
(Overseas Development Council: Washington DC, 1996), p.ll. 
2 Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done (The University of Chicago Press: 











approximately 12% of world population. Moreover, the continent is mired in poverty 
and debt. In recent years, in fact, there has been a net outflow of resources from 
Africa to its creditors. By one account this deficit is nearly two billion US dollars: 
Africa spends $14.5 billion each year repaying debts and only gets $12.7 billion in 
official aid.4 To clarify, the poorest region in the world is at present subsidizing the 
world's richest nations. Clearly, something has gone terribly wrong. What can be 
done? Why have most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa not progressed further? And, 
more fundamentally, what causes countries to develop? 
This paper adds to the growing chorus of dissent in development. It argues 
that the current situation is untenable. Developing countries are becoming 
increasingly frustrated by their continued poverty, and the industrialized nations are 
growing weary of continually remitting large amounts of money seemingly without 
any positive result. 
After an introduction to the issues, my approach and the development 
literature, a more thorough critique of the current development system is given. 
While it should be stated that many of these criticisms have been made before, the 
continued preeminence of the Washington Consensus in official development policy 
makes further discussion, and illustration of the policy's shortcomings, relevant and 
necessary. An alternative development strategy, following the recent progression of 
development theory, concludes Chapter One. 
The second chapter is devoted to a more in depth analysis through the use of a 
case study. The theory and practice of development in South Africa is examined as a 
proving ground for policies in a stable political environment. 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
THE EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
This paper approaches the above questions from an international political 
economy approach. Before the analysis, it is appropriate to define the relevant 
theoretical parameters as well as review previous work. 
3 At least to the degree many pioneers in the field had hoped. See discussion in Chapter One of 
Lancaster (p.I-13) as well as Frontiers of Development Economics: The Future in Perspective edited 
by Gerald M. Meier and Joseph E. Stiglitz, (Oxford University Press: New York, 200 I). 











I take my working definition of political economy from Robert Gilpin, who 
differentiates political economy from neoclassical economics in the following way, 
"Whereas neoclassical economists believe that the market is 
autonomous, self-regulating, and governed by its own laws, 
almost all political economists assume that markets are 
embedded in larger sociopolitical structures that determine to a 
considerable extent the role and functioning of markets in 
social and political affairs and that the social, political, and 
cultural environment significantly influences the purpose of 
economic activities and determines the boundaries within 
which markets necessarily must function."s 
Unlike traditional neoclassical economists, IPE does not treat governments as 
exogenous variables. Gilpin goes on to argue that IPE is further differentiated as a 
result of the questions pursued. Rather than focusing on efficiency, IPE is more 
interested in political questions such as the distribution of gains from market 
activities. 
As the reader will see below, I follow in the beliefthat markets develop out of, 
and for the purpose of, sociopolitical structures. This paper follows in the IPE 
tradition by, in Gilpin's words, focusing on the world economy's "impact on the 
power, values and political autonomy of national societies.,,6 Much attention is given 
to the current inability (as a result of global forces) of many Sub-Saharan African 
states to determine domestic economic policies. 
Of course, this leads to the seemingly ubiquitous issue of globalization, a topic 
that is important to both the study of international political economy generally and 
this paper specifically. As my paper makes certain assumptions about both the nature 
of international relations and the state of globalization some attention to these topics 
is important. 
Like Robert Schrire, I believe globalization is an often overused and nebulous 
concept.7 Regularly cited for a multitude of problems entirely unrelated to the 
increasing interconnectedness of the world economy, globalization has become an 
easy target, in part because of this difficulty in establishing an accessible definition. 
5 Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order 
(Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 2001), p.74. 











My focus on globalization will be on economic globalization, by which I mean 
the transition from nation-state based economies, to a system in which all agents have 
access to a common pool of resources.8 In a fully globalized world, therefore, there 
would be no differentiation among domestic economies; all economic agents 
(individuals, firms, governments) would have equal access to the essential economic 
inputs (capital, labor and technology). 
Using this definition, I follow many in arguing that we are far from a fully 
globalized world. Most of world production is produced for and sold to local markets. 
Most capital remains state based. The frequently cited statistic that trade, investment 
and financial flows were actually greater in size in the late 19th century, relative to the 
size of the international economy, than they are today gives additional support to this 
position. 
However, I disagree with Gilpin and many others who claim that economic 
globalization is not already a powerful force in the global economy. While 
acknowledging the comparative statistics from previous eras, I would argue that the 
breadth, if not the depth of globalization, has substantially altered the global 
economy. 
Today, globalized resources of capital, technology and labor reach across 
many different industries. Global forces actively shape the domestic economic climate 
of developing countries, and in many cases, distort these smaller economies in 
negative ways. Across a wide array of sectors, from textiles and agriculture to 
manufacturing and technology, globalization can actively inhibit domestic growth in 
the developing world more than ever before. 
If you don't see globalization as a pervasive, omnipresent microeconomic 
issue in the developing world, ask yourself, what obstacles face a local entrepreneur 
trying to create a new soft drink in the developing world? In a world where Coca 
Cola Company annually sells 1,122,000,000 unit cases in Africa alone, I believe the 
7 Robert Schrire, "Globalization and the State: A View From the South," Unpublished draft, University 
of Cape Town, 2001. 
8 The 'common resource pool' concept is attributable to Michael Veseth, "Selling Globalization" 











globalization of the last twenty years has a major impact on everyday economic 
activity throughout the developing world.9 
The Coca Cola illustration leads to my next argument. As Schrire has 
illustrated, the "idea of a non-state transnational corporation is a myth and a 
dangerous one at that.,,10 Corporations remain firmly established in nation-states. 
The mutually beneficial relationship prevents the establishment of any truly 
transnational corporation. Corporations share their country values, and benefit from 
their government's ability to open foreign markets and receive favorable terms of 
trade. (As a result, it should not be surprising that a majority of major international 
corporations are located in politically powerful states such as the US, UK, Germany 
and Japan.) Countries, in turn, receive the additional tax revenue, employment, 
foreign exchange and other benefits from being the home country to an international 
firm. In this view, corporations are not the drivers of globalization, as protestors 
insist, but rather they are extensions of national government interests. 
This approach, as the reader will see, follows Robert Gilpin in assessing 
international political economy from a state-centric realist perspective. Without any 
normative claim, I believe states are the primary actors in an anarchic system of 
international affairs. Interstate relations are driven by national interest, interpreted 
here as economic nationalism, or the neomercantilist model. Here, again, I follow 
Gilpin in his interpretation of mercantilism; namely, ''by mercantilism I mean the 
attempt of governments to manipulate economic arrangements in order to maximize 
their own interests, whether or not this is at the expense of others.,,11 
One point of clarification is needed, however. My support of a state-based 
realist approach may appear incongruous with the lengthy discussion below of 
international institutions and their powerful influence on developing countries. I do 
not believe states are the only important actors, merely that they are the primary 
actors. In this view, the World Bank and the IMF are examples of state involvement 
by other means. When this paper refers to IMF pressure upon developing nations, it 
is assumed that the IMF is acting in lieu of industrialized nations (read: US, and to a 
9 Figure calculated from information in the "Coca Cola Annual Report 2002." Coke currently has a 
41 % share of the non-alcoholic beverage market in South and East Africa and world net operating 
revenues of $19.56 billion. Online. http;llwww.cocacola.com. 
10 Schrire, p.14. 











lesser extent EU and Japan). I believe this approach, though admittedly simplified, is 
defensible by appealing to the voting power of individual nations within the 
IMFlWorld Bank decision-making process. Because of the weighting system, the US 
is the only country with effective veto power. As numerous examples have shown, the 
US has the capacity to not only shape World Bank/IMF policy, but also reject other 
countries' proposals for IMFlWorld Bank action. 
This state-centric realist perspective coincides with my approach to 
globalization in that I believe economic and technical forces have not replaced 
national power in shaping the world economy. As I argue throughout the paper, 
national governments repeatedly use political power to influence the international 
markets. There is not such thing as 'free trade' in existence today, as markets are 
never left alone to the extent that neoliberalism would demand. 
In fact, it is precisely because I believe the world economic system is a 
product of rampant economic nationalism that this paper should be written. 
Currently, as I seek to establish below, the wealthy/powerful states are shaping the 
nature of the emerging world order and defining the rules of engagement. As such, 
the terms of inclusion in the world economy increasingly favor the wealthy. 12 
However, there is capacity for change. 
As Schrire notes, globalization is a process, not an outcome. The end-point is 
not predetermined, nor has it been reached. Because we are far from a fully 
globalized world, there remains an opportunity to reform the process; to make it a 
more equity and inclusive process that provides for the betterment of all of humanity, 
not just the wealthy. This paper is predicated on that notion. 
The Origins of Development Theory 
At first appearance, it appears contradictory to move from a discussion of how 
national self-interest determines international economic relations to an analysis of 
foreign aid and development programs. Shouldn't self-interested states try to prevent, 
or at least remain indifferent to, the advancement of lesser-developed countries? 











This view assumes a zero-sum view of economic development that I believe is 
discredited by modem economics (though not discarded by many politicians). All 
nations have a vested interest in equitable growth of the world economy. Wealthy 
nations have both economic interests, such as developing foreign markets for exports, 
promoting healthy macroeconomic environments for investment, and absorbing the 
comparative advantages of cheaper foreign labor through increased imports; as well 
as political interests such as global peace and security. The tremendous disparity in 
wealth between the industrialized and developing worlds that has resulted in part from 
past failures in development strategies has certainly contributed to current 
international political concerns such as global terrorism and environmental 
degradation. As political, social, cultural and economic globalization continues, all 
nations have a long-term interest in promoting more equitable development. 
Nevertheless, as I argue below, one of the reasons for the failure of 
development theory has been its' emphasis on promoting the narrow self-interest of 
the industrialized work. From the strategic allocation of foreign aid budgets to the 
neoliberal prescriptions of open markets, many of the measures captured under 'aid' 
or 'development' actually benefit the wealthy nations rather than the poor. By 
deepening the divide between the North and the South, it is my contention that these 
policies are self-defeating and should be reformed. 
Goals of Development 
Before evaluating development theory and practice, we must define what we 
mean by development. Surprisingly perhaps, development is a very elusive term and 
has meant many different things over the last fifty years (See Appendix A). 
When first conceived of, developmental economists had a very narrow 
definition of development: the rise of basic economic indicators such as gross national 
product, or per capita GNP. At the time, it was strictly economists that were 
contributing to the theories of development so the parameters seemed clear. As 
countries developed, people got richer. Virtually no attention was given to the 
distribution of wealth or the political and social context in developing countries. 
As more notice was given to the field by sociologists, political scientists and 











indicators such as the Human Development Index became the standard appraisal of 
development. Taking into account broader measures such as literacy rates, political 
freedoms and life expectancy, these measures shifted the goals of development. Not 
only were the economic priorities of efficiency and GNP growth assessed, but also the 
political qualities of distributional impact and democracy were relevant. As the cliche 
says, development was given a human face. 
While the trend has continued to a more expansive definition of development, 
it was the resurgence of the World Bank that pushed the goals of development toward 
the elimination of poverty. Levels of poverty became important measures of 
comparative development during the 1970s and into the 1980s. 
Today, the evolving definition continues. While poverty levels remain one of 
the more tangible measures, developmental economists increasingly approach 
development using a wide range of 'soft' indicators. Following Amartya Sen's 
influential book Development as Freedom. new focus has been given to the level of 
political and economic freedom available to people. Development is defined as the 
ability to choose how to live "without being restrained by lack of income, health or 
opportunity." 13 
Sources of Growth 
As the goals of development have steadily changed over the past fifty years, so 
too has the proposed sources of growth. Macroeconomic growth theory has moved 
through three major phases in the last half-century (See Appendix A), though, 
discouragingly, many people still hold on to past theories as a panacea for the world's 
problems. 
Immediately following World War II, Evsey Domar published an article on 
economic growth entitled "Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment." 
His conclusions, though intended only for short-term recessions in the industrialized 
13 Nicholas Thompson and Scott Thompson, The Baobab and the Mango Tree: Lessons about 











world, were to become the foundation of development theory for the next fifty years 
(and unfortunately, maybe longer). 14 
Perhaps because of its simplicity, the Harrod-Domar model (Harrod was a 
British economist) is the most widely applied growth model in economic history. 15 It 
states that GDP growth is proportional to investment: in order to increase growth, 
simply increase the share of investment spending in GDP. 
At the time, development economists were convinced developing countries 
were stuck in a cycle of poverty. Because the country was poor, most of its citizens 
were just getting by, meaning there was a low national savings rate, which led to low 
investment, which created underfinanced and uncompetitive industries, which led to 
low growth, which continued the poverty circle. Aid was intended to meet the 
financing gap--the difference between the national savings rate and the amount of 
investment needed to grow the economy. The method was simple: a 'required' 
investment rate could be calculated to meet the target growth rate. Remarkably, 
William Easterly confirms this formula is still taught in training courses at the World 
Bank and IMF and is pervasive throughout development literature. 16 
The obvious fallacy of this analysis is its assumption that output is directly 
proportional to capital investment. The Harrod-Domar equation was formulated for 
full employment models in industrialized countries, and even then only in the short-
term. For development studies, it is misguided because it ignores the other inputs for 
growth and assumes that any investment in machines this year would have a one-to-
one mapping on next year's growth. This simplification overemphasized physical 
capital accumulation, leading to a multitude of projects throughout Sub-Saharan 
Africa that did not contribute to growth, were not needed, and contributed to the 
massive debt in the region. 
The Harrod-Domar analysis is indicative of the first generation of 
developmental economists' emphasis on state intervention in the markets. As Gerald 
M. Meier summarizes, the role of the state in development was "to promote capital 
accumulation, utilize reserves of surplus labor, undertake policies of deliberate 
14 It is interesting to note that by 1957, Domar himself had disavowed the theory. He said he never had 
any intention to derive "an empirically meaningful rate of growth," and that his theory made no sense 
for long-run growth. William Easterly, The Elusive Quest For Growth (The MIT Press: Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 2001), p.28. 











industrialization, and coordinate the allocation of resources through programming and 
planning.,,17 The belief at the time was developing countries did not have reliable 
market systems. Because of the recent perceived market failures of the Great 
Depression, economists were open to more state involvement in the economy, an 
attitude that would change with the second generation of development experts. 
It was the rise of market fundamentalism and neoclassical economics that 
shifted developmental economics theory in the 1980s. Development advisors warned 
states to 'get the prices right' and not interfere in the economy. 
Rather than grand theories of development, the emphasis of the period was on 
microstudies. The rapidly increasing amount of data from the developing countries 
led to various studies showing the economic costs of tariffs or the distorting effects of 
subsidies. Further discrediting Harrod-Domar, high rates of savings were shown to be 
neither necessary nor sufficient for development. Efficient markets were praised, and 
interference with them was seen as growth inhibiting. 
During this time, economists revisited the work of Nobel laureate Robert 
Solow. In 1957, he published an article with the surprising conclusion that 
investment cannot be a source of growth in the long run because of diminishing 
returns. Using the neoclassical production function, Solow argued growth is a 
function of capital accumulation, labor input and technical progress. Because 
continued investment in either capital or labor would lead to diminishing returns as 
the ratio of capital to labor becomes skewed, and there is a naturally limited pool of 
labor, a sustained increase in GNP can only be achieved by productivity increases, or 
the amount of production per worker. Technological change, he argued, is the only 
true long-term determinant of growth. 
Economists concluded that governments could do very little to impact the 
long-term growth rate. While programs to increase national savings rates or provide 
more 'effective' labor could help on the margin, for the most part development was 
seen as outside the control of domestic governments. A government's responsibility 
was to remove barriers to growth and then allow market forces to take care of the rest. 
16 Easterly, p.36. 
17 Gerald M. Meier and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., Frontiers of Development Economics: The Future in 











Eventually, this view consolidated in the neoliberal Washington Consensus, a strict 
formula of liberalization, marketization and privatization. 
However, there was light at the end of the tunnel for the governments of 
developing countries. A corollary of the neoclassical growth theory was the 
convergence theory. This posited that because of the technology gap between 
industrialized and developing countries, the developing nations could make 
substantial productivity gains by borrowing existing technology. Labor productivity 
in the developing world would increase faster than in the industrialized world, thus 
giving larger growth rates to the countries farther behind. Over time, this diffusion of 
technology, along with additional capital in the form of foreign investment, would 
enable less developed countries to converge with the industrialized nations through 
rapid growth. 
One problem with the neoclassical growth model is that all economic evidence 
disputes the convergence theory. As William Easterly points out, a simple thought 
exercise can show the fallacy. Today, the poor countries are just barely above a 
subsistence level of not starving to death. Therefore, they must not have had 
significantly lower income two hundred years ago, as much less income and they 
would not have survived. The rich countries, for which we do have data, have had 
substantial growth of income per person over the last two centuries. Of course, more 
rigorous data analysis has also been done, and confirms that divergence has increased 
rapidly since 1820. 
A second critique of the neoclassical model is that it fails to identify the 
sources of technological advance. As Robert Gilpin writes, "Although the theory 
teaches that technological progress bears the primary responsibility for increases in 
per capita income over the long run, the theory does not explain the detenninants of 
technological advance.,,18 
In response to the deficiencies of the neoclassical model, 'new growth theory' 
was developed in the late 1980s and 1990s. Based on the work of Paul Romer, among 
others, new growth theory incorporates technological progress and advances in 
knowledge as endogenous factors within the growth model. Romer's thesis was that 
technological advance was the result of conscious investment in technology-firms 











and entrepreneurs had to make the decision that increasing research and development 
spending would increase profitability. 
Other market failures were also added to the developmental theory. 
Economists became increasingly aware of imperfect and costly information, 
incomplete markets and high transaction costs in developing nations' economies. 
Risk and asymmetrical information were emphasized more than in the past. As new 
insight into the weakness of markets in developing countries progressed, more 
attention was given to the role of government. 
In combination with the rise in international political economy, new growth 
theory has once again reintroduced the role of the developmental state. Governments 
are seen as active contributors to growth, in that they must provide a stable 
macroeconomic environment. New growth theory acknowledges that markets operate 
within national political environments. Instead of' get the prices right,' economists 
encourage governments to 'get institutions right,' and increase support for research 
and development as well as growth of human capital through education and training. 
New growth theory utilizes new data provided by the rapid development in 
East Asia to support greater government intervention in markets. While neoclassical 
economists disagree, new growth theorists attribute the 'Asian Tigers' phenomena to 
the active role those governments played in encouraging private investment in 
strategic industries as well as in slowing and, more importantly, carefully sequencing 
the liberalization and privatization processes. Rather than unfettered markets, these 
economies displayed the proper complementarity between government and market. 
Thus, development theory has shifted its focus from governments to markets 
and then back to governments in its search for the sources of growth. However, in 
practice not all economists have accepted the market interventions of new growth 
theory. Many economists, particularly those in powerful positions, remain steadfast 
in their support ofneoliberal orthodoxy, as represented by the continued preeminence 
of the Washington Consensus. The central debate of developmental economics today 
is between the neoliberalism of the Washington Consensus and the developmental 
state of new growth theory; what is the best balance between market and government 











DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE: 
A CRITIQUE OF THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
In the last few years, this theoretical debate surrounding state-involvement has 
become particularly contentious. 19 Work from scholars in the developing countries 
(Bond, Deng, Ndulu) and from 'post-consensus' scholars in US (Stiglitz, Sachs) has 
attacked the World Bank and the IMF for both their policies and their prominent role 
in international development. Though without the same quantity of work, or high 
profile attention, the Bretton Woods institutions have defended their practices in both 
official statements and informal interviews. 
The debate has centered on the IFIs' (International Finance Institutions, used 
here as an abbreviation for the World Bank and IMF collectively) strict adherence to 
neoclassical market fundamentalism, or the so-called "Washington Consensus." As a 
term, the Washington Consensus was first used in 1989 by economist John Williams 
to describe the policies advocated by the US Treasury, World Bank and IMF. Though 
he was writing specifically about the development strategy for Latin America, the 
Consensus won quick appeal as a universal growth strategy. Pared down from 
Williams' original list often items, the Consensus came to represent three main goals: 
"macroeconomic discipline, a market economy and openness to the world (at least in 
respect of trade and FDI).,,2o 
This section examines each of the three tenets of the neoliberalist Washington 
Consensus as the World Bank and the IMF have utilized it. For each point, there is a 
discussion of both the advantages and disadvantages, as advocated by the participants 
themselves, and then an assessment based on the evidence available. Following the 
review of the policies specifically, attention is given to the broader concerns about the 
current role of the IFIs in structuring the development programs throughout the world. 
19 See in particular Stiglitz (2002), Bond (2002) and Rogoff (2003). 
20 John Williams, "Did the Washington Consensus Fail?" Speech for the Institute ofIntemational 













Of the three pillars of the Washington consensus, this one may be the most 
secure. Along with nearly all developmental economists (including many supporters 
of new growth theory), the World Bank and the IMF advise macroeconomic 
discipline - the closing of fiscal deficits and tightening of monetary policy to control 
inflation. It is widely accepted that sustained economic growth can only occur in a 
low inflation environment, which is the outcome of macroeconomic discipline. The 
recent contention, however, lies on the margin - the extent and timing of austerity 
measures implemented by the IFIs. 
Critics, such as Nobel Prize winning economist and former Chief Economist at 
the World Bank Joseph Stiglitz, have voiced concerns about the IMP's strict austerity 
measures. Stiglitz has become a champion of the developing countries by arguing 
that the financial 'straightjacket' that the IMF imposes on developing countries does 
more harm than good. Basic economics, Stiglitz contends, teaches students that the 
correct response to a recession is increased spending in order to stimulate the 
economy. IMF policies do exactly the opposite. Facing a country that is in the midst 
of slow or negative growth, the IMF imposes strict conditions on spending to balance 
the budget. Stiglitz agrees fiscal discipline is sound advice in general, but contends 
the timing of IMF austerity policies have lengthened and deepened developing 
. 21 country recessIOns. 
On similar grounds, Stiglitz objects to IMF monetary recommendations. The 
Fund typically insists upon high interest rates in order to curb inflation. Stiglitz, 
however, believes that the resulting high cost of capital would "make job creation 
impossible even in the best circumstances."n He believes maintaining a low cost of 
capital, and thereby encouraging entrepreneurship and job creation, is a better solution 
because it would stimulate growth initially. 
In addition to the economic problems generated by the macroeconomic 
discipline conditions of the IFIs, it must be noted that they impose severe political 
costs on the recipient country. They force governments that, by the fact that they are 
working on loans from the IFIs, are in a dire situation already to severely cut 
21 Joseph Stiglitz, "Finance for Development," Lecture at University of Cape Town. March 25, 2002. 











spending. Inevitably, the fragile governments must cut back on social spending, 
weakening already porous social safety nets as well as eroding political support for 
the government and potentially destabilizing the country. Especially with the 
increased amount of private investment in the last ten years, new growth theorists 
insist that any measures contributing to political destabilization should be revisited, as 
maintaining investor confidence has become an integral part of national development 
strategies. 
In response to the critics, the IMF defends its policies by appealing both to 
conventional economic theory and modem reality. Tough choices must be made, they 
insist, because fiscal discipline is indisputably linked to economic growth. 23 
Countries that continue to spend beyond their means will inevitably end up with 
enormous debts and have to pay significant amounts just to service the debts, 
detracting from their ability to invest in the future or provide for social spending (as 
has happened throughout much of Africa today.) 
With regard to interest rates, the IMF contends high rates of return are 
necessary to generate adequate levels of investment. It is an economic reality that for 
investment to occur interest rates must adequately reflect the level of risk in the 
economy. When the IMF has been called, there is a significant probability of default. 
Without a higher return to offset this increased risk, investors will not return. 
In specific response to the idea that countries can spend their way out of 
problems by temporarily increasing deficits in order to stimulate demand and restart 
the economy, Ken Rogoff, economic counselor and director of research at the IMF, 
insists the proposal is nonsense. He draws a parallel to supply-side economics, a now 
widely discredited theory, which believed it could generate the same amount of tax 
revenue by cutting the tax rate and waiting for the increase in growth to offset the 
loss. According to Rogoff, increasing government spending for countries that are 
already running significant deficits in a no-growth, or low-growth environment has 
been proven not to work many times in economic history, most recently during the 
deficit booming 1980s in America. 
While the IMF concedes its macroeconomic discipline policies have a mixed 
record, it believes the countries would be in much worse shape without their 











intervention. Because the IMF is by definition a lender of last resort, countries must 
be in significant financial difficulty when the loans are made. Michael Camdessus, 
former Managing Director of the IMF, maintains it is important not to mistake 
correlation with causation. It should not be surprising that there is a positive 
relationship between countries in economic turmoil and the number ofloans from the 
IMF, but this does not imply the loans caused, or exacerbated, the problems.24 While 
the detractors point to various cases as failures, he insists many of the same cases 
were successes, when looked upon relative to where the country would have been 
without IMF intervention. 
Nevertheless, a review of IMF structural adjustment programs reveals a mixed 
record, at best.25 However, neither new growth theory nor prominent IMF critics 
provide a viable alternative in the case of fiscal discipline. Countries must maintain 
fiscal discipline in order to promote growth. There are no short cuts, and typically 
when the IMF arrives countries are running massive deficits. In fact, in some cases 
the political cover brought by the IMF enables countries to curb out of control 
spending more effectively. 
Tight monetary policy, however, may not be the same bitter, though required, 
medicine. The policy admittedly hampers local entrepreneurs and small business 
growth by making capital more expensive in exchange for increasing investment. 
Recent studies, however, have shown there is no relationship between growth and 
investment in the previous term. Moreover, 90% of the time that sustained growth did 
occur (over 7% for four years), it was not preceded by substantial investment.26 If the 
attraction of increased investment is less appealing than previously thought, then the 
costs of raising interest rates (stifling domestic growth) appear to be unwarranted. 
The most damning criticism of the IMF's macroeconomic discipline programs 
is the simplistic manner in which they are proscribed. While the goals are indeed 
desirable in the long run, the IMF does not take into account the social and political 
implications of its rigid austerity programs. In the short term at least, poverty 
increases as government spending declines. Many governments cannot survive the 
24 Michel Camdessus, "An Interview with Michel Camdessus, Foreign Policy, September/October, 
2000, p.32-45. 
25 For example, William Easterly cites a study by Przeworski and Vreeland that found a negative 
correlation between IMF programs and future growth. (With the appropriate caveat by IMF chair 











political consequences. While investment may not have a correlation with growth, 
supporters of new growth theory have shown political continuity does. By decreasing 
political stability, as well as having devastating effects on the poor, the rigid 
macroeconomic programs of the IMF are too embedded in neoclassical economics 
(markets without social and political context), failing to account for the wider political 
economy of developing countries. 
Privatization (market economy) 
The second pillar of the Washington Consensus is establishing a market 
economy. Advocates insist on privatizing state-run industries and deepening financial 
markets. Again, the economic argument for private enterprises is sound. They are 
indisputably more efficient than state run operations because they utilize price signals 
and better align incentives between management and operations. However, many 
developmental economists argue the structural adjustment programs of the Bretton 
Woods institutions rush privatizations, imposing them on countries that are not 
equipped to regulate a market based system. 
For privatization to work successfully, adequate preparations must be made to 
prepare the markets, institutions, regulatory frameworks and social safety nets. New 
growth theorists contend that the IMF does not appreciate these difficulties. Markets 
do not immediately appear. While the transition is made, there are considerable social 
costs both to the consumers and to the laid off workers. 27 Especially in developing 
countries where there is imperfect information, limited financial resources, and 
virtually no social safety net for displaced workers, adequate preparations must be 
made before privatizations can occur. Without regulatory and legal frameworks in 
place, monopolies capable of extracting rents from consumers and making everyone 
worse off can emerge. In addition, rapid privatization has been rife with corruption in 
Africa (as well as in the countries of the former Soviet Union), as politicians can sell 
state industries for below market value and keep a slice for themselves or their 
supporters. 
26 Easterly, p.39. 











In the face of widespread criticism for the handling ofprivatizations 
throughout the developing world, and in Africa in particular, the IMF maintains that 
privatization allows for the most efficient distribution of resources. Even if the initial 
sale involves corruption, in the long term the market will regulate and end up more 
efficient in the end. 
As Keynes is often quoted, 'in the long term, we are all dead.' The issue is the 
avoidable tremendous short-term costs that rushed privatizations create. 
Economically, privatizations make sense. In reality, however, the political economy 
of developing countries necessitates a slow road to privatization. New growth theory 
has provided valuable evidence about the dynamics of information and markets in 
developing countries. The data support privatization only if it is part of a wider, more 
comprehensive program. Ensuring the rule of law, property rights, regulatory 
measures and some program for job creation for displaced workers is required. 
Timing and sequencing are vital.28 Unfortunately, the IMF has failed to recognize the 
lessons from previous failed privatizations and continues to push rapid, flawed 
privatization programs. 
Liberalization (openness to the world) 
Liberalization, or as John Williams originally phrased it, openness to the 
world, must be separated into two distinct categories. Trade liberalization, the 
lowering of tariffs and nontariff distortions in the global trade of goods and services, 
and capital market liberalization, the opening of domestic financial markets to foreign 
investment. The two types of liberalization each bring their own benefits and 
problems, and therefore must be evaluated independently. 
Despite strong political interests to the contrary, economics has proven 
international trade can increase growth throughout the world. The benefits of 
increased trade, however, are not evenly distributed within countries or between 
countries. Nevertheless, the IMF has promoted trade liberalization as a way of 











generating growth in developing countries, a view that is widely agreed as the correct 
decisi on. 29 
Few credible economists dispute the relationship between the opening of 
markets and economic growth. Once again, it is the timing and implementation of the 
IMF programs that causes concern among certain development economists. Even 
when trade is in the long run best interest of the country overall, measures must be 
taken in order to alleviate the displacement of workers in domestic industries exposed 
to international competition and to maintain employment. In developing countries, 
replacing lost jobs can be especially difficult. As Joseph Stiglitz writes, "[1]t takes 
capital and entrepreneurship to create new firms and jobs, and in developing countries 
there is often a shortage of the latter, due to education, and the former, due to lack of 
bank financing.,,3o 
IMF critics advocate a more gradual process of trade liberalization, buffered 
by government initiatives to ease the transition. New growth theorists highlight the 
East Asian countries as examples of the extensive government involvement in the 
liberalization process. The' Asian tigers' dropped barriers, but cautiously, and over 
time to allow domestic industries to prepare and a sufficient number of jobs to be 
created through increased exports. China is still in the process, over twenty years 
after it moved to 'marketize' the economy.31 
A second concern about trade liberalization is the increasingly disparate terms 
of trade. While the IMF forces developing countries to lower tariffs and nontariff 
barriers to trade, many industrialized countries remain protected in areas critical for 
the developing countries. Free trade will only promote growth in the developing 
countries if their exports are able to enter the more lucrative industrial nations' 
markets. Many believe the IMF has acted solely on behalf of the North, ignoring the 
increasing disparate terms of trade between the developing and developed world. 
Despite the increasing public furor over 'fair trade' in goods and services, the 
debate does not reach the same level among developmental economists as the debate 
over capital controls. Possibly because the former is more of a political issue and the 
29 Shahid Yusuf and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Development Issues: Settled and Open," in Frontiers of 
Development Economics: The Future in Perspective, p.229. 
30 Stiglitz, p.59. 











latter an unresolved economic issue, the debate over capital market liberalization is a 
dominant issue in developmental economics literature. 
At the most extreme levels, IMF detractors accuse the Fund of maliciously 
promoting capital market liberalization as a ploy to benefit private financiers in the 
industrialized world. In more benign circles, critics accuse the IMF of naively 
opening markets too fast, before adequate stabilization measures are put into place. 
Opening a country's capital markets allows for the free flow of investment 
into and out of the currency. It attracts 'hot' money, short-term loans and contracts -
which are usually little more than bets on exchange rate fluctuations - that can move 
into and out of a country overnight. While proponents argue it deepens the financial 
resources available to a developing country, detractors claim the effects can be 
destabilizing. Many believe the recently opened capital markets prolonged and 
deepened the East Asian financial crisis in 1997.32 
The most vocal critic of capital market liberalizations has been Joseph Stiglitz, 
who makes two critical points. First, it does not help to attract foreign investment (as 
the IMF contends) because investment is scared away by the destabilizing effects. He 
cites China as an example of a country that attracts significant investment (the most in 
the developing world) while refusing to open its capital markets.33 
Secondly, despite the IMF claims, opening capital markets doesn't provide 
more liquidity for the economy. To offset the increased risks associated with the 
volatile loans, the IMF insists countries must maintain adequate reserves equal to their 
short-term foreign denominated loans. Because they are required to keep reserves in a 
stable currency, most use American dollars. This means they must hold reserves in 
US treasuries, earning interest at 4%, in order to accept an equal amount offoreign 
capital (a majority of which comes from the US), for which they have to pay interest 
at 18%. Therefore, developing countries are simply subsidizing the US trade deficit 
by giving loans at a lower rate than they are receiving. Each year, the developing 
32 Stiglitz, p.99. 
33 In 2002, China actually received more foreign direct investment ($53 billion) than the US, though 
that was due more to the trelaendous drop in US FDI (down from $301 billion in 2000), a drop in part 
caused by the uncertainty of US markets, supporting Stiglitz's argument. "Is the wakening giant a 











countries lose roughly 14% of their capital without generating any additional capital 
for investment. 34 
The IMF concedes it may have been a little overzealous in its promotion of 
capital markets. It now supports open capital markets as a goal for developing 
countries in the long run because domestic investment cannot generate enough capital 
to spur growth (the legacy of Harrod-Domar continues), but believes sound 
institutions must first be put into place. To counter the argument about open capital 
markets worsening the Asian crisis, Ken Rogoffpoints to both Australia and New 
Zealand as countries with open capital markets that didn't experience the full Asian 
slump, in part because they had "highly developed domestic financial markets that 
were extremely well-regulated.,,35 The danger, Rogoff admits, is for the countries in 
the middle, those that open their markets without the established institutions to control 
and regulate speculative attacks--economies that combine weak financial markets 
and poor regulation. 
That, it seems, is exactly the point of Stiglitz and others who oppose the 
opening of capital markets in developing countries. It is bad economics because 
developing economies are -virtually by definition- small and inexperienced in 
financial regulation. Without adequate support systems, the risks are too great, as 
evidenced by the IMF recommendation that they keep foreign reserves equal to the 
amount of short-term loans they are taking in. For capital market liberalization to 
make sense, financial markets must have solid footing and credible regulators. The 
complexity of the issue may explain why Europe, industrialized since the nineteenth 
century, only opened its capital markets in the in the 1970s. 
The Current Role of the World Bank and IMF 
In addition to the objections raised about the specific policies of the IFIs, there 
has been considerable debate about their preeminent role in international 
development. Though bilateral aid is the dominant source of financial transfers to 
developing countries, the Bretton Woods institutions retain tremendous influence. 
Economists object to their expanded role in policy advising, in addition to demanding 
34 Stiglitz, lecture at OCT. Also, Globalization and its Discontents, p.66. 











more transparency from within the two Washington organizations. In reviewing the 
current landscape of developmental economics, a review of these debates is necessary 
before the discussion of alternatives. 
When they were chartered at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the IMF 
were designed with very different goals. The World Bank was intended to help with 
the war reconstruction and assist in raising the level of private investment to 
developing countries. The IMF was designed to be a source of emergency finance, a 
'lender of last resort' for developed economies with short-term liquidity problems. 
World economists, particularly John Maynard Keynes, worried about the 
interconnections ofthe global economy and the 'spillover' effects a country in trouble 
might cause. By creating an emergency source ofliquidity that could be utilized by a 
member of the world community in a domestic downturn, Keynes sought to address a 
market failure by enabling struggling countries to maintain full employment and 
prevent the spread of another global depression. 
Despite the sound logic of its' inception, some economists argue the IMF 
seems to have lost its intellectual coherence as development theory has shifted within 
the last two decades. A product of the first generation of development economists, 
the IMF was designed by Keynes to address a market failure - the inability of 
countries to raise liquidity in cyclical downturns. Now, however, the IMF reflects the 
market fundamentalism of the second generation, insisting on limited state 
involvement because of the unfailing ability of the market.36 If the market is always 
correct, why is there ever a need for IMF intervention? 
More worryingly, however, the IFIs have expanded well beyond their initial 
mandate. Beginning in the 1980s, the World Bank and the IMF began to extend their 
role through structural adjustment programs (SAPs). In order to induce recipients to 
change policies, the Bank shifted from making loan conditions on specific projects to 
making conditions on macroeconomic indicators, such as balanced budgets, low 
inflation and annual growth targets. 
During this time, the Fund dramatically increased the number of loans and the 
length of maturi ty on its loans. As a result of their new' adjustment with growth' 











policies, the IF Is became extensively involved in shaping the domestic economic 
policy of recipient countries. The IMF was no longer just a crisis resource, but a 
permanent fixture in the landscape of economic development. Throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, as the scope and power of the World Bank. and IMF grew, many loans 
were made, and yet, remarkably little growth was achieved.37 
In fact, rather than producing any growth, the loans had the effect of 
dramatically increasing the national debts of many African countries. As the IMF and 
World Bank. continued to make an increasing amount of new loans, the burden of 
debts began to erode any positive effects of new loans. As evidence of the 
increasingly problematic relationship between the African countries and the IF Is, a 
1995 African Development Report showed "there was a net outflow of resources 
from adjusting economies to the creditors, especially to the IMF and World Bank., 
during the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s." Between 1990 and 1992 the 
capital outflows totaled $4.58 billion for Africa as a whole. 38 
As the SAPs became widespread throughout Africa, many scholars grew 
increasingly critical both of the growing power of the IF Is and their uniformity of 
response to the economic problems of developing countries. For example, Lual Deng 
of the African Development Bank has written about the conflicting role ofIMF and 
World Bank. as lenders and policy advisors. He argues they ignored basic economic 
advice by requiring the African governments to pay loans back (to them) at the early 
stages of SAP development, rather than allowing the capital to remain in the 
developing economy.39 
Opponents have argued the SAPs were unsuccessful because in many cases 
they were designed and implemented without regard to the domestic political 
economies. The World Bank and the IMP ignored stakeholders, did not acknowledge 
the critical political and legal reforms that were required, and resisted popular 
participation and empowerment of the citizenry.40 
With regard to the uniformity of recommendations, economists have pointed 
to the World Bank. and IMF's strict allegiance to the Washington Consensus policies 
37 Easterly, p.102. 
38 Lual A. Deng, Rethinking African Development: Toward a Framework/or Social Integration and 
Ecological Harmony (Africa World Press: New Jersey, 1998), p.50. 
39 Deng, p.51. 











without regard to the local situations. Opening markets before they were ready, 
pushing privatization when a corrupt government could exploit the situation and 
failing to recognize the socio-political costs of the austerity programs are all 
complaints raised against the Consensus, as discussed above. While there may be 
nothing wrong with the policies in the abstract, economists have complained about 
"the way in which they have been formulated and applied without any due attention to 
the prevailing objective conditions in most of the African countries:";1 
Perhaps the most widespread criticism of the World Bank and the IMF is their 
lack of transparency. They remain shrouded in secrecy, a few thousand economists 
hidden away on H Street in Washington DC, unassailable and insulated from both the 
actual circumstances in the developing countries and due democratic process. The 
policies are formulated in private meetings, the officials are not elected by any 
populace, and the decisions escape public scrutiny. Compounding the troublesome 
image of a cabal of corporate interests secretly colluding, the country representatives 
are hardly unaligned with certain domestic interests. At the World Bank, the country 
representatives are trade ministers, advocating the views of industry. At the IMF, 
they are finance ministers and central bank governors, representative of the finance 
industry. Especially because the policies that emanate from World Bank and IMF 
meetings affect so many, an increasing number of development economists insist 
upon greater transparency within the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Why Change is Required 
The current system of international development in Africa is untenable 
because of the continued underdevelopment of much of the continent in the face of 
fifty years of Washington-led programs. The strict adherence of the World Bank and 
the IMF to a neoliberal, market-oriented development paradigm, as well as their 
persistent efforts to expand their mandate and become permanent custodians of most 
developing countries' economic policies has impeded growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The Washington Consensus is somewhat a misnomer, because it implies universal 
agreement for these policies. Increasingly, the objections to the policies have spread 











from the developing countries to the halls of the institutions themselves, as was the 
case with Joseph Stiglitz and William Easterly. 
Moreover, the situation is untenable because the Washington Consensus 
applies a discredited economic model for development. The programs of 
macroeconomic discipline, privatization, and liberalization are all honest goals, but 
are being pushed on developing countries in an unsustainable manner. Because it 
fails to acknowledge the wider social and political institutions that must be in place, 
new growth theory predicts the Consensus is doomed to fail. Data from the last 
twenty years confirms this view. The Washington Consensus is too simplified. The 
World Bank and IMF continually neglect the more comprehensive social and political 
development that must precede economic development, while assuming the wide-
ranging institutions required will spring up as ifby royal decree. Former Managing 
Director of the World Bank Jessica Einhorn captures it best, though too 
diplomatically, by writing, "the bank is in danger of overdetermining development to 
the point where it is a tautology, not a reasonable prescription. To argue that 
developing countries need market-friendly policies, stable macroeconomic 
environments, strong investments in human capital, and independent judiciary, open 
and transparent capital markets, and equity-based corporate structures with attention 
to modem shareholder values is to say that you will be developed when you are 
developed. ,,42 
Alternatives are possible. This analysis ofthe Washington Consensus and the 
IFls has proceeded as a template for a comparative study. Of course, not everything 
is incorrect about the existing development structures. Many of the goals and 
recommendations are sensible and achievable. However, a new program with its 
origins in the developing world, its emphasis on the wider social implications of 
domestic economic policy and its structure defined by the recent additions to 
development theory from political economy, could substantively improve the future 
for the millions of people struggling below the poverty line in Sub-Saharan Africa. 











THE PATH FROM HERE: 
AN ALTERNATIVE GROWTH TEMPLATE 
It is time for a new paradigm. After nearly fifty years of throwing money at 
the developing world (albeit money not necessarily intended for development) and 
having policies emanate from Washington DC, change is overdue. To begin, we must 
take a broad perspective: What are the critical factors affecting development, what 
can be learned from the past successes (and failures) and, most importantly, what is 
achievable in the current global political economy? 
A first step is to look at the evidence. What has contributed to or inhibited 
growth over the last forty years? From the extensive economic research that is 
continually providing data and analysis we have been given some insights. I will 
divide my analysis into factors relating to domestic political and economic realities in 
the developing countries and to the policies and practices of international aid 
organizati ons. 
Internal Factors Affecting Growth 
Until the recent progress made by new growth theory, most developmental 
economists did not treat local governments as endogenous variables in their models. 
Too often governments were treated as philosopher-kings, always acting in the best 
interest of the state. Of course, this overly simplistic modeling caused a tremendous 
amount of difficulty. As one researcher put it, it is only a recent recognition in 
development literature that "regimes - particularly in Africa - were not only not truly 
concerned with 'development' but willing, indeed eager, to sacrifice national growth 
for regime survival.,,43 
The introduction of political economy into development literature has aided 
researchers in identifying factors that inhibit growth. Politicians in developing 
countries, like politicians worldwide, prefer power, survival in office, influence and 
electoral (if there are elections) support. They only become willing refonners or 











supporters of policies that contribute to economic growth when it is in their rational 
interest; namely, when they believe they will lose their job if they do not change.44 
Without that force, governments will continue to act against the best interests 
of the nation state as a whole. The key insight of political economists, to explain what 
had previously been perceived as the irrational behavior of many governments, is that 
the 'tragedy of the commons' occurS.45 William Easterly, of the World Bank, shows 
how governments will rationally pursue reckless, growth-killing policies because their 
access to government resources is limited. Rather than build an economy for the 
future, the government will steal what it can today on the assumption that someone 
else will be in power at a later date46 
While all governments face a similar incentive to cheat, it is particularly 
because many developing countries have weak, illegitimate governments that 
destructive policies are pursued. Knowing there is no widespread consensus or 
mandate to rule, the government must maximize its return during the limited 
opportunity it has in power. As a result, one of the leading indicators of when a 
government will pursue destructive policies is the degree of social polarization. 
In his study of developmental policy, Easterly calls social polarization "the 
fundamental difference between redistributionist and developmentalist governments. 
Societies divided into factions fight over division of the spoils; societies unified by a 
common culture and a strong middle class create a consensus for growth-growth that 
includes the poor,,47 Without cohesion, countries have a tendency to flounder 
between populist governments redistributing income, without growth, and elites who 
suppress mass education and democracy. Easterly traces the roots of social 
polarization to great inequality or ethnic conflict. Evidence supports the thesis, as 
researchers have found a correlation between high income or land inequality and low 
growth. 48 
44 Merilee S. Grindle, "In Quest of the Political: The Political Economy of Development 
Policymaking," in Frontiers of Development Economics, p,350. 
45 Previously, economists believed the interests of the government would be aligned with the state even 
if the government was entirely corrupt and self-interested. Because you can steal more from a rich 
country than a poor country, development economists believed even bad governments would support 
growth, 
46 Easterly, p,259. 
47 Easterly, p,256, 
48 This thesis has also been used by economic historians to explain why the United States, which had 











Following Easterly's argument, countries that have a high number of ethnic 
groups will have greater social polarization and therefore exhibit slower growth. 
Intuitively, there are many reasons why this may be the case. For example, in a 
country with many languages, there will not be as strong an incentive for universal 
education, as there are no knowledge leaks from one group to another. To test his 
theory, Easterly uses the probability that two individuals from the same country will 
speak different languages as a proxy for ethnic diversity. Interestingly, this measure 
is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has had notoriously slow growth over the last 
forty years, and lowest in Korea and Japan, two of the fastest growing economies in 
the world over the same period. The full results are given in the chart below. 
~le 1: Ethnic Diversity and its consequences for policies, 1960-1989 
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Source: William Easterly, Elusive Quest/or Growth, p.273. 





The chart shows that the least ethnically diverse countries grew roughly three 
times as fast as the most ethnically diverse countries. Other economic indicators, 
such as the black market premium on the currency and the financial depth of the 
banking systems, were substantially better in the least ethnically diverse areas. 
The implications of Easterly's research are significant. Rather than focus 
strictly on market reforms and reigning in government spending, his findings show 
development policy must also work to shift allegiances from ethnic factions to a 
America, where a limited amount of land and multitude of sugar plantations and mines kept inequality 











national identity. Efforts to impose strict macroeconomic discipline can undennine 
weak governments and perpetuate instability and ethnic divisions. 
External Factors Affecting Growth 
In addition to the recent insights in endogenous factors contributing to the 
economic growth of developing countries, new analysis has identified how 
international efforts can be refined. 
Although long at the center of basic economic analysis, developmental 
economics seems to have lost sight of one fundamental tool: incentives. 
Governments, people, international agencies, politicians, and common citizens all 
respond to incentives. If you believe your government is corrupt and will steal any 
income, you do not have much of an incentive to work. If you believe there will be 
no opportunities for employment with a degree, you do not have much of an incentive 
to educate yourself. If you believe the level ofinternational aid is unrelated to your 
policies, you do not have much of an incentive to improve. 
Between 1980 and 1994 Zambia received 12 loans from the World Bank and 
IMF. During this time, at the height of the neoliberal structural adjustment programs, 
maintaining low-inflation was a key goal of economic reform. Yet, between 1985 and 
1994, Zambia had inflation over 40% every year except 2.49 Because the IFls made 
no effort to withdraw aid according to the policies of Zambia, there was little 
incentive to lower inflation. Consequently, inflation remained. 
Throughout the developing world countries with more poor get more aid. The 
World Bank and IMF lower aid amounts as countries begin to alleviate poverty and 
conditions improve. One study showed that a doubling of per capita income leads to a 
33 percent reduction in aid. 50 Rather than having no incentive to improve policies, 
this actually provides a disincentive to reduce poverty - encouraging poor 
governance. The World Bank confirms this relationship in their own internal study, 
49 Easterly, p.105. 
50 The World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why. (Oxford University Press: 











Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn '( and Why, which shows there is little 
correlation between good governance and total amount of aid.51 
International donors must get the incentives right. They must increase their 
selectivity, rewarding countries that pursue good policies with more aid. The same 
World Bank study showed that in a good policy environment, a one percent ofGDP 
increase in aid increases growth by .5 percentage point, a rate of return of 
approximately 40%, assuming a depreciation of roughly 10 percent a year. 52 
However, in a weak policy environment similar amounts of aid were much less 
effective. For aid to work, it must reward good policies. 
Recent studies have also helped international donors recognize the best time to 
increase aid. In a World Bank study from 1998, a sample of60 countries was used to 
determine whether an increase or a decrease in aid was more likely to induce better 
policies. "They identify 87 episodes in which there is a surge in aid (a large change 
relative to what the country had been receiving.) In only six of the 87 episodes was 
the surge followed by significant reform. In 92 cases in which there was a large 
decline in aid, 16 were followed by reform. Thus, reform is more likely to follow a 
decline in aid than an increase in aid.,,53 
With regard to the type of aid needed to spur growth and development, there 
has been important recent scholarship. It is widely agreed that capital investment, in 
the style of the Harrod-Domar equation, does not lead to growth. Similarly, in the 
words of William Easterly, the "growth response to the dramatic educational 
explosion of the last four decades has been distinctly disappointing.,,54 In fact, there 
is "no positive association between growth in human capital and growth of output per 
worker.,,55 If it is not physical capital growth, or human capital growth, what, then, 
can spur growth in developing countries? 
Differences in productivity growth (output per worker) explain over 90% of 
the differences across countries in per capita growth from 1960 to 1992.56 If 
international donors focused on improving productivity per worker, development 
51 Assessing Aid, p.43. 
52 Assessing Aid, p.36. 
53 Assessing Aid, p.49. 
54 Easterly, p.72. 
55 Easterly, p.74. 











efforts would be much more efficient. One of the best ways to do this is by increasing 
investment in technology and subsidizing local research and development. 
In the past, international aid has not been as effective as it could have been 
because it was allocated according to Cold War politics or it was based upon 
simplistic economic models of development. Today, with the end of the Cold War 
and more systematic analysis of aid programs, international aid is poised to become 
much more effective. By imposing selectivity, giving more aid to the countries that 
implement sound development strategies, and focusing on the political economy of 
recipient countries, aid can significantly contribute to the international development 
process. 
Building Better Institutions 
While keeping in mind the above discussion about domestic and international 
factors contributing to past success and failure, this section tries to set forth a new 
plan for development; a plan centered on empowering countries themselves. 
First, countries must' get the institutions right.' By institutions, I do not mean 
merely the identifiable government or private-sector agencies and organizations, but 
the entire social contract of the society. I will take Douglas North's broader definition 
of institutions from Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance; he 
writes that institutions are "humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction."s7 A society's institutions encompass all formal and informal rules and 
norms of behavior as well as the brick and mortar buildings of governance. 
Following colonialism, neither the formal nor the informal institutions that 
define a unified nation had evolved. Many African states were left with a transitional 
economy in which more than 75% of population was subsistence farming. Societies 
were divided between ethnic groups, with different social norms and means of 
authority in different regions. Moreover, the abrupt independence of many countries 
left a "political system which almost inevitably empowered the charismatic, not 
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necessarily qualified, leaders who devised economic models with as much potential as 
zeppelins loaded to the brim with concrete."S8 
With hindsight, we can see development strategies may have been more 
successful if they had focused on solidifying the states, helping to bring together the 
many multi-ethnic states. Economic development requires a strong (not necessarily 
big) government. States must be able to regulate the economy, enforce the rule oflaw 
and property rights, and maintain peace and security. Today, many states must build 
their capacity before growth will return. In "State Capacity and Effective 
Governance," Deborah Brautigam argues that African states must build capacities in 
four areas: regulatory (legal), to ensure predictability; technical, to provide greater 
stability; taxation, to raise revenues; and administrative, for effective government 
service with minimal red tape.59 Currently, she notes, African governments are filled 
with low morale, low skill levels and low accountability. 
Building strong national institutions is the only way African governments will 
be able to break out of the poverty cycle. In the formal sector, this means eliminating 
some of the incentives for corruption, such as a high black market premium for 
domestic currency. Other less tangible institutions will be strengthened as a 
meritocratic civil service, a vibrant free press and an active civil society are 
established. In addition, recent work by the World Bank has highlighted how 
international aid can promote stronger institutions.60 
African Contributions 
Another road to growth, and one that complements the strengthening of 
institutions, is greater ownership ofthe development process by the African countries. 
Currently, development is widely desigIied by anonymous economists on H Street in 
Washington DC. As a result, World Bank and IMF officials must pressure 
governments to adopt reform plans in addition to convincing them they are the correct 
solutions to the country's problems. 
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African Development Bank economist Lual Deng believes the World Bank 
and IMF policies have ignored "traditional African thought and culture." Without 
input from African intellectuals, Deng believes the designs were doomed from the 
outset. As he has written, "I would argue the adjustment programs in the 1980s -like 
the modernization paradigm - were inconsistent with African development thought. 
The cornerstones of this development thought are family-hood, sharing, and 
consensus-building, which the SAPs tend to undermine through their emphasis on 
individualism and self-seeking motives.'.61 
Part of the problem is the lack of voices coming from Africa. E. Gyimah 
Boadi and Nicolas van de Walle insist that a broader and more sophisticated debate 
about economic policy is needed by African elites.62 Deng goes further by referring 
to an 'Intellectual poverty' that "has allowed inappropriate development policies and 
strategies that are inconsistent with African thought and culture to be applied with 
impunity" ... "The 'intellectual poverty' in Africa manifests itself mainly in the 
absence of a serious African scholarship that can systematically guide development 
policy formulation and ensure its consistency with African thought and culture.,,63 
An intellectual contribution to development theory by Africans themselves is 
crucial for two reasons. First, without input, the resulting policies do not adequately 
correspond with African attitudes, social institutions, and value systems. As a result, 
they are often ill suited for the African context and predestined for failure. Secondly, 
without African contribution, there is the psychological effect oflack of ownership. 
Governments are less inclined to battle with different constituencies and fight for the 
reform efforts, further diminishing the chances of success. 
If African states are going to be able to breakout of their cycle of poverty, they 
must first buy into the development process. By creating policies that reflect African 
traditions such as community inclusiveness and 'consensual' government, African 
intellectuals can make development policies both more effective and empowering. 
61 Deng, p.44. 
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Growth through Agriculture 
The last aspect of the alternative approach to growth is a renewed commitment 
to agricultural development. Since the first wave of developmental economics in the 
1950s and early 1960s, industrialization has been the emphasis. However, with 
agriculture dominating both the domestic economy and the exports of most Sub-
Saharan African states, it makes sense to focus on strengthening agriculture as a 
foundation for further economic growth. 
The primary role of agriculture in Africa's economy is indisputable. 
Agriculture employs 60% of the labor force, accounts for 40% of the exports and for 
between 20 and 33% of the continent's GDP.64 Yet, it is still a largely undeveloped 
sector. Africa uses only 25% of its arable land, compared with Asia, which uses 
64.6%. In the last twenty years agricultural yields, the amount of food raised per 
hectare, have grown substantially throughout the world but have stagnated in Africa. 
There can be two forces for economic growth in the agricultural sector of 
Africa's economy. First, improving the production side. Africa's farmers need to be 
empowered to plant what they want. Promoting land reform has the potential to raise 
production by aligning the incentives of the farmer with the output. Currently, 
sharecroppers have to share half their crop, essentially a 50% tax on production. 
Without the tax, more investment in agriculture would be made. A properly 
administered peaceful land reform plan, in which workers get access to land, credit 
and instruction of new techniques, could significantly boost output. A precedent has 
been set by Korea and Taiwan, where successful land reform policies preceded their 
remarkable developments.65 
African sates can help. In addition to moving ahead with sensible land reform 
policies, states can encourage agricultural production by providing access to yield-
enhancing inputs such as technology and credit - a particularly vital need for many 
small, independent farmers because of the substantial up front costs offarming. 
Promoting agricultural research, providing micro-finance and improving domestic 
63 Deng, p.l 00-1. 
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infrastructure to reduce the cost of getting crops to markets, especially valuable 
overseas markets, would all contribute to agricultural growth.66 
The second major force for economic growth in the agricultural sector comes 
from increasing demand. Specifically, ending the costly protectionist policies of 
many developed countries in order to open more markets for African products. 
It is a well-known 'dark secret' that while the developed world has been 
pushing for increased liberalization in the developing countries (as a fundamental 
tenet of the Washington Consensus no less), they have been systematically protecting 
their markets from the exports of developing countries. Recent studies estimate that 
over $700 billion worth of trade barriers still confront exports from developing 
economies to the OECD, and agreed measures to liberalize key sectors, like 
agriculture, have been sluggishly enforced in the developed world 67 
The current scenario is especially duplicitous because the protections left in 
the developed countries fall disproportionately in areas where developing countries 
are able to provide exports, with the prime example being the agricultural supports. 
Both the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the US fann and sugar 
subsidies are examples of the industrialized nations' selectively enforced free trade 
principles. As a result, the agricultural exports of the developing countries face tariffs 
that exceed those on OECD exports (of all products) by factors of 10 or more.68 
While recent multilateral trade negations, such as the Uruguay Round, have 
brought attention to the issue, current political realities have prevented any 
improvements. In fact, the situation may be deteriorating, as one World Bank 
calculation showed that the Uruguay Round actually reduced incomes in Sub-Saharan 
Africa by more than two percent as a result of further liberalization in areas favorable 
to the industrialized world.69 
The irony is these supports hurt the developed countries as well. In addition to 
inhibiting growth in the developing countries, to whom they then make sizable 
bilateral aid transfers, the protection is paid for by consumers. Estimates of the static 
66 Christopher L. Delgado, "Agricultural Transfonnation: The Key to Broad-Based Growth and Poverty 
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gain alone that would result from eliminating the barriers to merchandise trade range 
from US$250 billion to US$620, of which between one-third and one-half would 
accrue to developing countries and the rest would remain in the developed nations.7o 
In order for full agricultural growth to occur in Africa, these political hurdles 
must be overcome. Unifying voices, through the Non-Aligned Movement, has helped 
some, and the agricultural supports are on the agenda for the current Doha Round of 
the multilateral agreements, but more political pressure must be put on the industrial 
countries to live up to their promises of 'free and fair trade.' 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has made the argument that the current landscape of economic 
development for Sub-Saharan Africa is systematically ill conceived and inefficient. 
Beginning from a state-centric realist position, I have made the case that the current 
structures are best understood as the products of the North and do not have the best 
interests of the South in mind. While those in power, at the World Bank and the IMF 
as well as the leaders of many industrialized nations, voice concern and sympathy, 
their actions run counter to their words. The growth in the power of the Bretton 
Woods institutions over the past twenty years has further hampered growth programs. 
These powers continue to strictly adhere to the Washington Consensus, 
despite widely published revisions to the premises of these policies. As the debate on 
the merits of the Washington Consensus shows, the policies should not be entirely 
discarded. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, it seems convincing to say any 
program for development must incorporate the basic tenets of sound macroeconomic 
policy, international openness, and a market based system. However, the Consensus 
as implemented by the IFIs hurts countries, rather than aids them. 
Pushing rapid privatization, opening capital markets and trade barriers before 
local markets and regulators are ready and forcing social spending cuts in times of 
need are all areas where the policies seem to benefit the industrialized countries rather 
than reflect the latest development theory. 
Using the concepts of new growth theory, and the expanding goals of 
development, I have suggested alternative areas for emphasis. Yes, market discipline 











and refonn must come, but if it is moderated by these refonns it will be more 
successful. 
First, development projects must be more inclusive. They cannot merely 
focus on ending deficits and selling state assets. Programs must first build capacity 
within the countries for refonn. Following the work of others, I have emphasized 
investing in national unity, strengthening institutions and solidifying government 
power. 
Second, the countries themselves must be brought into the fold. Development 
programs shaped by African voices will be accord with regional thought and culture. 
Following this advice, the call given by many African economists for growth through 
agriculture should be heeded. 
Third, the international community must make better use of incentives. Aid 
programs will only contribute to growth if aid encourages good governance by 
rewarding it with more aid. Selectivity is needed. Within states, also, they must fund 
projects most likely to lead to growth - recent data shows this means investing in 
productivity growth, not capital. 
Enacting these refonns in the quickest manner possible is the best hope for 
Africa. As argued above, globalization is not nearly complete, meaning that 
refonning the system remains possible. The end of the Cold War has brought about a 
new opportunity for development in Africa. The continent no longer needs to be a 
battleground for Cold War politics. 
However, if any of these recommendations are to evolve political leadership, 
long a weakness for the continent, will be key. As William Easterly'S research has 
shown, governments can impede progress just as easily as they can advance it. 
Building consensus, gaining legitimacy, establishing public trust in government and 
maintaining a viable social contract are essential. Responsible governments are 
needed, both to provide stability and regulate markets domestically and to represent 
national interests internationally. There is little hope of success in the critical task of 
opening industrialized nations' markets without legitimate leaders effectively making 
the case to their counterparts in the North. 
As the case study below illustrates, this type of leadership can exist on the 
African continent. South Africa has emerged from decades of being a political and 











the continental prospective provided in this chapter by focusing specifically on South 
Africa's development experience. The differences and similarities are essential to 












DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, A CASE STUDY 
To quote one South African academic: in South Africa, more than any other 
country, development is a political issue.71 While South Africa has been intimately 
involved in the worldwide debate on issues in development, the unique political, 
economic and social circumstances have required unique solutions. 
Nearly fifty years of authoritarian, minority rule has left deep divisions in the 
political and economic landscape. Apartheid created a two-tiered economic system. The 
white minority enjoyed a first-world infrastructure as well as high levels of employment, 
income and other indicators of human development, while the vast majority of the 
population languished in poverty typical of the developing world with poor literacy, 
electrification, sanitation, income and employment statistics. Until 1994, no real attempt 
was made to provide an inclusive national development program. 
With its exceptional history, the choice of South Africa as a case study for Sub-
Saharan development requires some justification. The relative wealth, political stability 
and overall size of the economy give it tremendous advantages over the typical Southern 
African country. Eowever, as the analysis below will show, I believe South Africa faces 
many of the same issues. 
Moreover, it is precisely because of its unique position that South Africa's 
development is worthy of study. The lessons learned from South Africa's experience are 
vitally important to understanding the political economy of development in the region. 
The remarkable opportunity for a politically legitimate government to internally create its 
own development policies without significant outstanding debt or a legacy of failed 
programs helps to identify the crucial variables missing from other countries in the 












reglOn. Africa is desperately in need of a success story, both for its self-image and for its 
international reputation. South Africa's development is widely viewed as a crucial 
opportunity to promote stability and growth in the region. By identifying and isolating 
the differences between South Africa's experience and that of the rest of the continent, 
insight can be gained on how to best break the cycle of poverty and economic 
underdevelopment throughout the continent 
DEVELOPMENT THEORY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
South African development theory includes the ongoing debate over the 
Washington Consensus and the relevant arguments of the previous chapter, but it is also 
shaped by the high levels of inequality within the society. What Ben Turok alludes to in 
his assertion that politics is central to development in South Africa, is the delicate balance 
between the politically empowered black majority and the economically empowered 
white minority. 
South African development policy is shaped by the extreme conditions brought 
about by the legacy of apartheid. Nation building and inclusiveness are essential early 
targets. Maintaining the support of both the wealthy minority stakeholders and the 
previously disadvantaged populace has been critical. While there have been stumbles 
along the way, the continued peace and relative prosperity (compared both to other 
developing countries in the past decade and the world economy in the last three years) is 
both remarkable and a testament to the country's economic leadership. 
Nation Building 
As if directly following the recent literature on the adverse effects of social 
polarization (see the discussion of William Easterly'S work in Chapter One), the ANC 
immediately began the process of unifying the deeply divided populace when it took 
power in 1994. In his inauguration address to the city of Cape Town, President 











people. Today we celebrate not the victory of a party, but a victory for all the people of 
South Africa."n From that point forward, reconciliation and national unity became a 
primary objective of the government's development strategy. 
As part of this plan, new national symbols, such as the flag and anthem, were 
created to generate national pride from all communities. The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission provided a peaceful, therapeutic way to address the injustices of apartheid, 
as well as to leave the painful legacy in the past. In addition, the government capitalized 
on Mandela's ability to command respect from the whole country, white and black, to 
maintain optimism. An example of the state-led movement to develop a national pride 
encompassing all South Africans was the coordinated response to the 1995 Rugby World 
Cup. 
Today, the effort continues. Officials from all levels of government still 
frequently refer to the 'new' South Africa, as if to emphasize the change in opportunities. 
The government's recent 'Proudly South Afiican' campaign is evidence of the ongoing 
effort to maintain optimism and unity in the future - as well as to promote domestic 
production. 
The Economic Platform: Washington Consensus, or Not? 
A second critical issue in South African development theory, as in any country, is 
the proposed source of growth. Because of the unique political economy of the country, 
with the large percentage of capital in the hands of select few and the political power 
centered away from those with the economic control, South Africa is a particularly 
interesting case study. 
In 1994, political control of the country shifted from the economically 
conservative, white minority to the mass-based, communist-supported ANC. South 
Africa reentered the global economy as sanctions fell away from important world markets 
for the first time in nearly twenty years. The tremendous changes left many wondering 
which course South Africa would take. The business community feared reckless 
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spending, protectionist trade policies and political instability. The ANC's alliance 
partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), expected significant social spending and labor protection. 
In reality, South Africa's macroeconomic policy has remained remarkable 
disciplined, more so even than it was in the last fifteen years of the Nationalist Party 
regime. Without facing the harsh loan conditions of the World Bank and IMF directly, 
South Africa has adopted the Washington Consensus almost exactly as enumerated by the 
Bretton Woods institutions. Understanding how and why the ANC turned to market 
discipline upon gaining control of the country; or, as one commentator put it, how it 
"went from Marx to Milton Friedman with a moment's notice" is crucial to 
understanding the political economy of the country, and the extent that the ANC's 
policies are repeatable throughout Southern Africa.73 
The legacy of the AN C, though it is sometimes disputed, is that of a mass-based 
movement, with "a strong commitment to the disadvantaged, especially the poorest of 
these.,,74 Even though many contend the ANC was always less a populous and a more 
middle-class, professional movement, it certainly derives its main support nationally from 
the disadvantaged. Moreover, with its key alliance partners the SACP and COSATU, 
there was every indication that the ANC would prefer more progressive, protectionist 
policies upon gaining political control of the country. 
One possible hindrance, however, was the nature of the control the ANC actually 
gained. The negotiated settlement with the Nationalist Party, while preserving general 
peace and a political transition, left much of the economic control of the country in white 
hands. To many observers, ''white South Africans got away with murder.,,7s In their 
effort to secure a smooth and quick transfer of political power, ANC negotiators allowed 
for extensive concessions to the white community. Protecting property rights, 
guaranteeing continued employment for politically allocated public sector jobs, and other 
measures essentially locked in the radically skewed economy that the apartheid policies 
73 Peter Vale, International Affairs, Vol 78, Num 3, July 2002. The quote appears in a review of Patrick 
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had created. By leaving the massive concentration of economic control in white hands, 
the ANC limited its possible economic policy alternatives. 
However, it is too simple to insist that the ANC is merely catering to the 
economically powerful white minority with its' economic policies. In fact, the inverse 
may be true. While the distorted economic reality in South Africa may have forced the 
ANC's hand, it is presumptive - and incorrect, I believe - to insist the current leadership 
does not honestly believe its' market based, neo-liberal approach is in the best interest of 
all South Africans. 
Many theorists have argued it is global realities, not domestic ones, that have 
pushed the ANC to the right. This view, common among the many left-leaning political 
scholars in South Africa, answers the riddle of the ANC shift by saying "the leadership 
came to the conclusion that the neo-liberal economic orthodoxy is the only show in town, 
or, more conventionally, that there is no alternative.,,76 The neoliberal Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) is interpreted in the context of international 
globalization, an economic reality beyond the power of any country, much less South 
Africa, to stop.77 
Less polemically, some scholars have shown the shift can be explained by the rare 
power enjoyed by the ANC following the first election. Following the first nation-wide 
elections in 1994, Mandela could be more secure in his authority than most African 
leaders. The situation met the two primary conditions for economic reform: a competent 
and coherent economic team, and political leadership that were willing and able to 
insulate them from political pressures.78 Because of its overwhelming public support, the 
ANC was able to take a long-term perspective and endure the short-term political costs 
associated with macroeconomic discipline. In this view, it is the unique circumstances of 
the extended political 'honeymoon,' itself a result of the long liberation struggle, enjoyed 
by the ANC that enabled them to push the economic reforms that have been externally 
imposed on the rest of the continent by the World Bank and IMF. 
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Of course, this implies the ANC supported the neoliberal agenda itself and used 
the opportunity to push a policy it believed in. Without theorizing on the internal ANC 
debates, which itself would demand an entire thesis, one approach to this problem is the 
rational actor model. In order to gain political power, the ANC aligned itself with the 
largest source of domestic support, the trade unions. However, as a more middle-class 
movement the ANC intellectual cadre, especially the exile corps in Lusaka, never fully 
subscribed to the left's agenda. Once in power and because its domestic support was 
virtually assured by the issues surrounding apartheid, the ANC was able to move to the 
right and impose a development program that conforms to the international consensus of 
a sound development program - thereby raising its' standing in the international 
community. 
Indeed, the significant economic reforms, begun with the Reconstruction and 
Development Program (RDP) in 1994 and furthered along with GEAR in 1996, coincide 
almost directly with the broad guidelines of the Washington Consensus. Strict budgetary 
discipline, evidenced by annual deficit targets, has been adhered to with every ANC 
budget - much to the disappointment of many who expected broader social spending. By 
maintaining its tough fiscal austerity program, the government has tried to lower the 
persistent inflation that has hampered the South African economy for the past twenty 
years. 
Although external events such as the Asian financial crisis and a weak Rand (in 
one case due to false rumors of President Mandela being ill) have held inflation rates 
high, tight monetary policy has complemented the fiscal policy by trying to slow the 
constant price increases. As part of its development strategy, the government created an 
independent central bank based on the inflation targeting German Bundesbank model. 
As a result, South Africa's macroeconomic discipline has been held up as a model for 
others in the region. 
In addition to the austerity measures, the government has pursued the Consensus 
in privatization, trade and strategy. Since 1994, South Africa has been pursuing a slow 
but steady privatization program of core state assets. The recent Telkom share offer was 
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the latest in a series of privatizations and partial privatizations of state assets, which 
totaled R14.8 billion in assets between April 1994 and February 2000.79 Moreover, the 
government has lowered tariffs faster than their WTO agreements required, while GEAR 
targeted Small, Micro, and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs) as the source of development. 
In sum, South Africa's macroeconomic discipline, increased foreign trade, attempts to 
attract foreign investment, SMMEs investment and programs designed to increase human 
capital, present a development strategy distinctly based on a Washington Consensus 
template. 
However, though the broad themes of South Africa's development strategy have 
unquestionably been aligned with the Washington Consensus, there are essential 
differences that reflect both domestic concerns and the recent developments in new 
growth theory. 
The South African government was acutely aware of the problems associated with 
rushing macroeconomic discipline, privatization, and liberalization. Since 1994, these 
three tenets of the Washington Consensus have been long-term goals, but they have been 
pursued at a deliberate pace. The privatization program described above was deliberately 
paced to avoid rent-seeking monopolies and massive corruption. The deficits inherited 
from the Nationalist government were slowly reduced to a sustainable rate over the 
course of five years. The pace and sequencing of the ANC Consensus-based reforms 
make it substantially different from the typical structural adjustment program 
implemented in Southern Africa. 
Secondly, the government has provided significant incentives for investment in 
both education and technology. President Mbeki, virtually echoing the recent writings 
by Paul Romer and others in new growth theory, recently justified these measures by 
saying, "Technology by itselfwill not necessarily eradicate poverty, nor will it end 
underdevelopment. Yet, the availability of technology and its dissemination amongst 
many sectors of society, is a critically necessary condition for economic and social 
development."so 
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Thirdly, the South African government has adopted a more comprehensive 
approach to development, incorporating Sen's development as freedom approach. The 
Black Economic Empowerment programs represent the government's cornmitment to 
expand the opportunities for previously disadvantaged groups. While opponents claim 
the measures have moved too slowly, there remains a constant push by the government, 
manifested in the various BEE programs and incentives (one example is the recent 
Mining Charter imposed on the mining corporations), to provide a more equitable future. 
A fourth key difference, which separates the South African development program 
from that of its neighbors, is the absence of the IFIs. Unlike any other country in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the fiscal and monetary discipline has been entirely self-imposed.81 
From the very inception of ANC development strategy, as articulated below in the 1994 
RDP statement, maintaining ownership of domestic economic policies has been a central 
tenant: 
"Relationships with international financial institutions such as the World 
Bank: and International Monetary Fund must be conducted in such a way 
as to protect the integrity of domestic policy formulation and promote the 
interests of the South African population and the economy. Above all, we 
must pursue policies that enhance national self-sufficiency and enable us 
to reduce dependence on international financial institutions.,,82 
The fifth fundamental difference of South Africa's development strategy, and the 
subject of a much longer discussion in the next section, is the active engagement of the 
international community, both in the North and the South, to structure better terms of 
trade, and complement the domestic economic development plan. 
The Political Platform: NEP AD and Regionalism 
In addition to the neo-liberal domestic economic platform, a core principle of 
South Africa's development program has been to redefine its international relationships. 
81 To the extent that the current global economic environment allows this to happen. To clarify, what I 
mean by "self-imposed" is that the refonns were not as a result of conditional loans, structural adjustment 











The transition to a majority ruled government has allowed South Africa to reengage both 
with the Southern Africa region and continent, and the global community. The 
government has seized this opportunity in an attempt to change the entire African 
development landscape. 
As discussed in Chapter One, many development theorists have been calling for 
increased African leadership and contributions to development. Too often, they contend, 
strategies for development emanate from Washington without a real appreciation for 
local conditions, local institution and local values. As a result, these 'solutions' are 
destined to fail. 
In response to the call for continental leadership, South Africa has taken a lead in 
reshaping the development landscape. President Mbeki, along with Nigerian President 
Olusegun Obasanjo, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Senegalese President 
Abdoulaye Wade, presented The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to 
the OAU Summit in Lusaka in July 2001.83 
As its introduction states, NEP AD is a pledge by African leaders to 
"extricate ... the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in the 
globalising world.,,84 The objective, again to use their own language, "is to consolidate 
democracy and sound economic management on the continent.,,85 It sets both long-term 
objectives, as in the case of eradication of poverty on the continent, and near term goals 
such as the enrollment of all children of school age in primary schools by 2015. 
The basic thesis ofNEPAD is that in return for aid, investment, debt relief and 
increased trade opportunities, African states will provide democracy, good governance 
and peace. At its core, NEP AD seeks to redefine the relationship between Africa and the 
donor community. By shifting from a mode of dependency to active participation, 
NEP AD attempts to improve the efficacy of international aid efforts. With African 
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ownership, the leaders insist, comes the additional resolve to see projects through and the 
improved dignity of the African people. 
NEP AD hinges on instilling this greater pride in the continent. By removing the 
image of an outstretched hand in search of a donation and fostering the belief in genuine 
partnership with the North, NEP AD is designed to end the Afro-pessimism so pervasive 
on the continent. 
Moreover, the plan confirms the African leaders' view that democracy is 
fundamental to growth. President Mbeki calls the "complete liberation of peoples of the 
continent" one of the "important preconditions for the renewal of Africa.,,86 As such, 
membership in NEP AD requires countries to sign a Democracy and Political Governance 
Initiative that demands good governance conforming to international standards. Among 
the conditions are parliamentary democracy, fixed tenns of office for national leaders, 
and an independent judiciary. To ensure these commitments are more than empty 
gestures, an independent peer review will take place every three years. 
It is this peer review mechanism that leaders point to as the substantive departure 
from previous attempts at development. For the first time, African governments will be 
imposing their own conditions for sound practices on their neighbors. Regional 
collective action is intended to strengthen the ability of governments on the continent to 
maintain democratic reforms in the face of domestic groups that have an interest in 
maintaining the poor government practices (As discussed in Chapter One). This external 
pressure, a creation ofNEPAD, is designed to solve the recurring problem of weak states 
regressing into authoritarian regimes. 
The response from the international community has been very positive. As 
President Mbeki confinned, "The element that has enabled the marketing ofNEPAD is 
that it is an African initiative. We are making our own commitments about democracy, 
about peace, about corruption and about homegrown efforts to put our own resources into 
development.,,81 
However, while the language appears strong, it is still uncertain how the peer 
review mechanism will work in reality. Many observers point to the recent trouble in 
86 Mbeki, speech to Joint session of Parliament, Oct 31,2001. As quoted in Gibb, p.138. 











Zimbabwe, and President Mbeki and Olusegun's reluctance to take a strong stand against 
the Mugabe regime as evidence of a lack of resolve to maintain the NEP AD goals. The 
missed opportunity, together with the continual problems of 'good governance' on the 
continent, has led to increased concern over this aspect ofNEPAD. 
Which leads to the question, why would South Africa want to tie itself to such a 
troubled continent? Why, in the aftermath of the transition, when South Africa had the 
remarkable opportunity to define its place in the world, did it chose to form closer links 
with the consistently underachieving Sub-Saharan Africa? 
One answer, of course, is the natural affiliation South Africa feels towards its own 
continent. Especially following the long freedom struggle that was heavily supported by 
neighboring countries there certainly was a sense of allegiance to the region. Moreover, 
as a relatively prosperous and powerful country, there was a moral obligation to 
contribute to regional development as a whole. 
However, there is an alternative to this idealist interpretation. A realist approach 
to explain of South Africa's commitment to NEPAD is to look at the current international 
political realities. In this view, South Africa needed improved conditions on the 
continent, in addition to the credibility provided by being seen as the African leader, to 
advance its own national interest. 
Many scholars have documented the regional spillovers affecting South Africa. 
The poor economic performance and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa has created 
negative perceptions for investors, both foreign and domestic.88 As a result, "investment 
rating services list Africa as the riskiest region in the world. Indeed there is some 
evidence that Africa [that is Sub-Saharan Africa] suffers from being perceived by 
investors as a 'bad neighborhood' .... Africa as a whole is rated significantly more risky 
than is warranted by these [economic] fundamentals."s9 Despite being a markedly 
different economy than its regional counterparts, South Africa is affected by this 
international perception, as the evidence in the next section will show. 
Because South Africa - whether justly or not - is perceived as a member of the 
African community, with its associated increased risks, it has an incentive to end the 











negative perception. If, through NEP AD, South Africa can encourage good governance 
and sound macroeconomic policies from enough of its neighbors, then investors will 
begin to make distinctions between countries with sound policies and those without; 
eliminating the negative externality for South Africa. 
From this view, NEP AD can be seen as an investment just like any other. By 
improving their neighborhood, South Africa hopes it can increase both domestic and 
international investment, as well as avoid other significant potential risks such as cross-
border movements of people (political refugees), disease and conflict. 90 Rather than 
benevolent leadership by South Africa, the program is seen as a calculated advancement 
of national interest. 
A second pragmatic reason for South Africa to be the most active supporter of 
NEP AD is the role it creates for South Africa in the global community. NEP AD gives 
President Mbeki a stronger platform when he demands changes in the basic structures of 
international organizations. 
South Africa, like all developing countries, would benefit significantly by 'fair' 
terms of trade. As shown in Chapter One, the current international system of trade favors 
the industrialized world at the expense of the developing countries. As a central goal, 
NEPAD, in Thabo Mbeki's words, "seeks to achieve a new, better and equitable deal for 
Africa within the global community.,,91 
NEP AD strengthens the bargaining position of the African countries in two ways. 
First, it unifies their voices. NEP AD sets clear demands for a more equitable trading 
system, as well as prioritizing the issues to clarify the position of the African countries. 
Second, it provides increased credibility. By acknowledging ownership of African 
development, and making firm commitments for good governance and accountability, 
NEP AD is an attempt to redefine the relationship between the African countries and the 
industrialized world. 
President Mbeki, as a leader of this movement, is given opportunities to directly 
address the leaders of the North that would be unavailable ifhe was merely representative 
89 Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning, "Why has Africa grown slowly?" Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 13 (3), 1999, p.20. As quoted in Gelb, NEP AD, p.22. 











of own country. At the 2002 G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, for example, Mbeki 
presented the case for a more equitable global economy to the leaders of the world's 
seven largest economies and Russia. Since NEPAD was announced in 2001, Mbeki's 
profile has increased throughout the industrialized world, as can be seen from his 
frequent speaking engagements to audiences ranging from ASEAN to the UN General 
Assembly. NEP AD has solidified a new role for South Africa in the global community -
as a bridge between the North and the South. 
While its NEP AD leadership is the latest example of South Africa's attempt to 
bridge the divide, its political leadership has been positioning itself in this role since the 
end of apartheid. Beyond the African continent, South Africa has become an active 
leader of the developing world in many venues. Since 1994, South Africa has been chair 
of 113 member Nonaligned Movement, the 53 member Commonwealth, and the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development, in addition to having Trevor Manuel on the 
Board of Governors of IMF and Mamphela Ramphele as a Managing Director of the 
World Bank. 
This bridging role is another key piece of South Africa's development strategy. 
By becoming a leader in the developing world, South Africa has been able to shape the 
agenda - as evidenced by its ability to push developing countries to participate in the 
Doha Round of the WTO, to achieve reforms from within the system rather than 
shunning trade liberalization overall. 92 Additionally, the South African leadership hopes 
that its' higher profile on the global stage will attract much needed foreign investment. 
In addition to its global implications, South Africa's advancement ofNEPAD has 
direct benefits for its regional strategy. Through SADC, South Africa is also attempting 
to solidify its role as a connection between the South and the North. Because South 
Africa stands in the awkward position of having a relatively skilled labor force and 
relatively high wages (in addition to very powerful trade unions) its development strategy 
cannot rely on growth through cheap labor-intensive manufacturing, the textbook growth 
strategy used by the' Asian tigers.' As such, a fundamental focus of the development 
91 Thabo Mbeki, "Address by the President of South Africa and Chairperson of the African Union," 8th 
ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh, November 5, 2002. Online, http://www.polity.org.za. 
92 Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko "South Africa and the African Renaissance," International Affairs, Vol. 











strategy is increased regional integration - combining the cheap labor of the other 
countries within SADC with the skills and manufacturing of South Africa. South Africa 
can become an intermediary between the lower income agriculture based countries in 
Southern Africa and the industrialized nations. Essentially, an integrated SADC could 
act as a microcosm of the global economy, with South Africa the regional hegemon. 
For this strategy to work, however, SADC needs more comprehensive regional 
integration. The current debate within SADC lies in 'open' or 'closed' regionalism.93 
Closed regionalism refers to regionalism where the regional market is the end goal. 
Growth is expected because trade barriers are eliminated and producers have access to an 
enlarged regional market. Reducing tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other impediments to 
trade is the primary focus of 'closed' regionalism. So far, this characterizes SADC's 
regional integration approach. In contrast, open regionalism attempts to use the regional 
economy as a launching point towards the larger global economy. Open regionalism 
seeks trade and cooperation linkages beyond the immediate geographic region. The 
focus is on coordinating production, pooling resources and more effectively capitalizing 
on intra-regional comparative advantages. This is the type of regionalism that can 
provide the greatest benefits for South Africa.94 
Thus, NEPAD's emphasis on responsible government and macroeconomic 
policies can also be seen as South Africa's advancement of regionalism as a defense 
against globalization. For, as Stephen Gelb has written, ''without the improvements in 
governance which NEP AD seeks, it is hard to imagine the increased harmonization of 
standards and the ease of cross-border movement which integrated production tied to 
global networks would require in the region.,,95 
South Africa's enhanced presence in regional, continental and global international 
affairs should be viewed as a concerted effort by the ANC to improve domestic economic 
conditions. For analysis, this section has divided South Africa's development theory into 
two sections, the domestic economic policies and the international maneuvering. Yet, 
both are, and should be seen, as integral and complementary aspects of a coordinated 
strategy for development. 
93 Gibbs, p.37. 











As has been shown, South Africa's development strategy reflects current 
international development theory while also incorporating a distinctly South African 
approach. The next section sets out to assess this strategy by looking at the evidence. Is 
South Africa's development program working? What are the key indicators we must 
look at? Using the government's own theory for development, I intend to provide a 
critical analysis of the progress made in the past eight years, as well as the prospects for 
the future. 
ECONOMIC REALITY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
Any attempt to evaluate a national development strategy must be clear of the 
desired outcome of development itself. While this certainly demands a more thorough 
discussion (an attempt of which is given in Chapter One) it may be helpful quote what the 
policy makers themselves are striving for. In his last budget speech, Finance Minister 
Trevor Manuel opened his remarks with the following quotation from Amartya Sen: 
Freedom is both the primary objective, and the principal means of 
development... What a person has the actual capability to achieve, 
is influenced by economic opportunities, political liberties, social 
facilities, and the enabling conditions of good health, basic 
education, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives. 
These opportunities are, to a great extent, mutually 
complementary, and tend to reinforce one another.96 
While much of the further discussion will center on how the 'economic 
opportunities' of the South African people have changed in the last nine years, it is 
important to acknowledge the broader goals of development. Manuel's quotation above 
roughly corresponds to the theoretical approach to development taken by the ANC, as 
discussed in the last section. By actively addressing the massive inequality left by 
apartheid, establishing macroeconomic stability, and providing continental and regional 
95 Gibbs, p.37. 
96 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom. As quoted by Trevor Manuel, "Budget Speech By Minister of 











leadership, the government has indeed focused on trying to enhance every South 
African's 'actual capacity to achieve.' 
The government's efforts to address the deep divisions within society have met 
limited success. The campaigns designed to solidify a common national identity have 
struggled to alter the ingrained self-image of many South Africans. As Mamphela 
Ramphele has recently written, 'dual citizenship,' between one's own group (white, 
black, Zulu, Xhosa, Afrikaner, etc.) and the nation continues to create tension.97 Even 
within the government, Ramphele cautions that 'radical rhetoric masks the pursuit of 
narrow self-interest' by ANC officials.98 In addition to the racial legacies from apartheid, 
the strong sub-national identities fostered by unions and political parties (ANC, IFP, 
COSATU) further impede the development of national identity. For example, Ramphele 
notes how the ANC's continued policy of self-disciplining members who hold public 
office undermines the development of accountability in public service and inhibits the 
growth of a strong civic culture.99 
While healing the wounds of apartheid will take generations, nation building has 
proceeded faster than many believed it could in 1994. Despite the eleven official 
languages, English (for better or worse) is rapidly becoming a unifying force between 
disparate communities. Increasingly, the 'dual citizenship' Ramphele correctly identifies 
is fading as national allegiances arise. Based on William Easterly's recent research, it 
appears all efforts by the government to accelerate this process should be encouraged. 
In contrast to the to the 'softer' goal of national unity, the more tangible goals of 
greater equality of opportunity remain more elusive. In 1993, the top decile of 
households earned half of the total income, while the bottom four deciles (which account 
for 52 percent of population because poor households have more people) took home less 
than 10 percent of total income.lOo However, the government has kept its commitment to 
97 Ramphele, p.? 
98 Ramphele, p.? 
99 Ramphele, p.l O. 
100 Nicoli Nattrass and Jeremy Seekings, "Race and Economic Inequality in SA," Daedaulus: Why South 











support this segment of the population. Spending on the same bottom four deciles of the 
population increased by fifty percent between 1993 and 1997.101 
Unfortunately, as Nicoli Nattrass and Jeremy Seekings have recently shown, the 
government's program of economic transfers may be too simplistic to achieve the desired 
development goals. While President Mbeki and the ANC are targeting economic 
inequality through black economic empowerment and other race based initiatives, a 
majority of the income inequality in South Africa today is within the black population 
rather than between different race groups. 102 
In 1975, only two percent of the top decile of households, ranked on income, were 
black, while ninety-five percent were white. By 1996, the top decile was twenty-two 
percent black and sixty-five percent white. 103 Certainly, there is not income equality 
between race groups, but the achievements of many within the black population have 
created greater disparity within the race than within the population as a whole. 
By analyzing the decile breakdown of household income, Nattrass and Seekings 
contend the key determinant of inequality in South Africa is employment, not race. For 
example, most machine operators and similar semiskilled workers are in deciles six to 
nine, meaning they generally earn more than fifty percent of the population. 104 Most 
unskilled laborers are spread between the fourth and eighth deciles. Thus, a household 
containing one unskilled laborer generally earns more (in the formal economy) than thirty 
percent of the population-a surprising statistic, though justifiable when considering 
formal unemployment estimates range from thirty to forty percent. In South Africa, the 
problem is not the inadequacy of a 'livable wage' (as it is in many developing countries); 
the problem is the number of jobs available. As Nattrass and Seekings conclude, "Most 
101 Though it is uncertain how beneficial this spending was in the quality of service provided because most 
of was project related, Le. spending on schools or water access, where efficacy is hard to assess. Nattrass 
and Seekings, p.57. 
102 "Within group inequality among the black population now accounts for over two-thirds of inequality, 
whereas it only accounted for 38 percent in 1975." Nattrass and Seekings, p.49. 
103 Nattrass and Seekings, p.49. Deciles are formed by ranking national household income and dividing the 
data into ten groups of equal size. The first decile represents the ten percent of households with the least 
income, and the tenth with the greatest. Moving from households to the population is only approximate, 
especially because poorer households tend to have more people. 
104 One weakness of this argument, it must be conceded, is that this data reflect participation in the formal 
economy only. With roughly thirty-five percent unemployment, many of the households receive income 
from informal economic activity, which is notoriously difficult to obtain data for. However, I believe my 











Table 2.1: GEAR Prediction versus Actual Performance 
Annual growth rates 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Real GDP 
GEAR Prediction 3.5 2.9 3.8 4.9 
Actual Performance 4.2 2.5 0 1.2 
Private Investment 
GEAR Prediction 9.3 9.1 9.3 13.9 
Actual Performance 6.1 4.7 -2.9 4.4 
Real wage growth (Private) 
GEAR Prediction -0.5 1 1 1 
Actual Performance 1.7 2.3 8.6 3 
Employment (non-agricultural) 
GEAR Prediction 1.3 3 2.7 3.5 
Actual Performance -0.7 -1.7 -3.7 -3.2 
Conventional deficiUGDP: 
GEAR Prediction -5.1 4 -3.5 -3 
Actual Performance -4.9 4.6 -3.3 -2.6 
Source: SARB, Quarterly Bulletin, March (2000), as quoted in Nattrass and Seekings, p.61. 
poor households are poor because they have no access to wage income ... the relationship 
between the lack of employment and poverty is much stronger in South Africa than in 
more developed countries.,,105 
Using the empirical evidence one can conclude that for a development program to 
make a significant impact on inequality in South Africa it must focus on job creation 
rather than race-based initiatives. With an unemployment rate hovering around thirty-
five percent, there is ample room for improvement. However, since 1994 the government 
strategy has failed to reduce unemployment. While intending job growth of up to three 
percent a year (see table 2.1), the neo-liberal GEAR policies actually have increased, 
rather than decreased unemployment. By one count, over 500,000 non-agricultural jobs 
were lost in the fonnal sector during the first three years of the Gear initiative (1996-
1999).106 
105 Nattrass and Seekings, p.54. 
33 Bond, p.41. In fairness, other reports state 400,000 jobs in the fonnal sector were lost. However, the SA 
Reserve Bank puts the figure at 490,000 between 1994 and 1999. Admittedly, some factors were beyond 
the control of the South African government, such as the Asian fmandal crisis and the tight monetary 
policy of the independent central bank. In fact, Boyd, Spicer and Keeton, attribute the loss of 200,000 jobs 











One issue in securing wider employment is the current strength of the labor 
movement. While GEAR promised that wage agreements would be made more sensitive 
to "regional market conditions, [and] the diversity of skill levels in firms of varying size, 
location or capital intensity," union strength has prevented this from happening. 107 One 
study showed how a ten percent increase in the union relative wage effect (the ability of 
unions to push their members' wages above those of non-members) reduced employment 
by 5.6%.108 According to the same study, if the union wage effect were reduced by fifty 
percent, then black employment overall would increase by about two percent, 
redistributing income from the upper-middle class African union workers to the lower-
wage and marginalized poor who are not currently participating in the economy. 109 
In fact, throughout the economy wages have been growing faster than the 
government anticipated (see table 2.1). The higher wages and lower employment levels 
have also meant that the productivity of labor has increased. Between 1994 and 1999, 
labor productivity growth exceeded four percent per annum, rates not equaled in South 
Africa's recent history. I 10 
Higher labor productivity has made the economy more capital-intensive, making 
the need for more investment ever more crucial for development. However, as Table 2.1 
indicates, investment was another key area where government predications were overly 
optimistic. 
South Africa's inability to attract investment, both domestic and international, 
was one of the principle reasons behind the adoption of GEAR. By implementing the 
Washington Consensus-based, neoliberal growth strategy, the government intended to 
become a haven for capital in Africa, anticipating annual investment growth of over nine 
percent. In reality, as Table 2.1 shows, the tough choices required by the fiscal austerity 
were rewarded not with strong investment growth but rather with a decline in investment 
of nearly four and a half percent in 1999 alone. 
107 Department of Finance, Growth, Employment and Redistribution, as quoted in Nattrass and Seekings, 
p.62. 
108 T.P. Schultz and G. Mwabu, "Labor Unions and the Distribution of Wages and Employment in SA," 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 51 (4) 1998: 680-703. As cited in Nattrass and Seekings, p.53. 
109 Nattrass and Seekings, p.67. (Note 20) 











It was GEAR's failure to generate more investment that pushed South Africa to 
look at alternative explanations for the lack of investment. The evidence indicates South 
Africa faced difficulty because of the negative perceptions of Africa as a whole. I II In 
cross-country studies, Africa overall, and South Africa specifically, does not attract the 
level of investment that the economic indicators alone would suggest; prompting 
researchers to label an 'African dummy' variable to explain the underinvestment. 
Africa's exclusion for the world economy is well documented. According to the 
WTO, by 1999 Africa accounted for only 2% of all merchandise exports, down from 
7.4% in 1948. 112 In 2000, Africa's share of world GDP was 3.2% while its population 
share was 12.2%. 
For investments, the evidence is similarly bleak. Sub-Saharan Africa (including 
South Africa) as a whole received just over 3% of total FDI for low and middle-income 
countries during the 1990s. I \3 By 2000, Africa attracted just 0.7% of world FDL 114 For 
South Africa in particular, annual average FDI inflow between 1993 and 1998 amounted 
to only 1 % ofGDP (compared to Malaysia'S 7% ofGDP and Chile's 4% ofGDP). 
Of more concern, South Africa also suffers from the continent's problem of 
keeping investment in the country. One 1997 study, by Collier and Gunning, estimates 
that 37% of African investment is being held overseas, compared to just 3% in East 
Asia. lls Most tellingly, South Africa has had a net outflow of foreign direct investment 
since the end of apartheid. J 16 
With South Africa unable to escape a regional indictment by investors, both 
domestic and international, the logical approach was to end the perceptions of 
inhospitable governance and investment environments in Southern Africa. IfNEPAD 
refonns enough governments, investors will begin to differentiate between countries, and 
the' Africa dummy' will fade away. 
III Gelb, NEPAD, p.2. 
112 Michael Moore, Address to the 4th Ordinary Session of the OAU/AEC Conference of African Ministers 
of Trade. As quoted in Gibbs, p.ll. 
1I3 Gelb, NEPAD, p.22. 
114 WTO, speech by Michael Moore at the conference on Developing Countries' Interests in the Milennium 
Round. As cited in Gibbs, p.12. 
liS Gibbs, p.12. 











Because NEP AD remains in its implementation period it is too early to assess 
whether this strategy will succeed. The critical aspect appears to be the peer review 
mechanism. Investors are anxious to see how much leverage African governments are 
willing to give the collective body. Without strong measures for peer review, the 
visionary words of an African Renaissance will become hollow promises. Unfortunately, 
President Mbeki and President Olesugun's tentative response to the Zimbabwe elections 
last March do not bode well for an effective peer review system. 
The Zimbabwe situation is a particular concern for South Africa because it is also 
affecting regional stability and economic growth. A central goal for South Africa of 
NEP AD is greater stability and sound governance in the Southern Africa region. Along 
with South Africa's regional agenda of pushing for greater regional integration within 
SADC, NEPAD is part of South Africa's political and economic investment in the region 
- an investment made to serve domestic political and economic goals. 
The evidence supports this 'realist' interpretation ofNEPAD and SADC 
integration. Since 1992, when South Africa formally joined SADC, regional trade and 
investment has thrived. Manufactured good exports to Southern Africa grew by 15.4% 
per annum between 1992 and 1996 in $US terms, and those to the rest of Africa by an 
impressive 24.2% per annum. 117 Altogether, there was a 52.6% increase in trade with 
Africa between 1994 and 1995, and by 1998 South Africa's trade surplus with Africa was 
over $2.7 billion in 1998. 
Moreover, South African investment flooded into the area. Before the 1994 
election South Africa's foreign direct investment in Africa was around R3.7 billion. 
Soon after it had more than trebled, to R 13 billion. I IS Private South African companies 
such as Sasol, SABMiller and Standard Bank made substantial investments throughout 
the continent. South African Airways currently operates 70% of the routes in Africa and 
40% of the traffic between Europe and Africa through its alliance with Swissair. MTN, a 
South African cellular network provider, recently invested $425 million in a Nigerian 
cell-phone network. 1 19 
117 As cited by Gelb, NEPAD, p.14. 
118 Vale and Maseko, "South Africa and the African Renaissance." 











This economic engagement, as well as political leadership, is evidence of South 
Africa's acceptance of its role as regional hegemon. As Table 2.2 shows, the South 
Africa economy already overwhelms the region. Within SADC, for example, South 
Africa is home to 60% of the road network, 65% of the rail and 86% of the rail freight. 
South Africa's GDP is more than three-quarters of regional production. 
Table 2.2: South Africa & SADC - Basic Economic Indicators 
1995 (unless indicated) South Africa SADC SA as % of SADC 
Surface Area ('000 sq km) 1221 6932 18 
Population (millions) 39 135 29 
GNP ($bn) 125 165 76 
GNP per capita ($) 3160 1225 258 
Exports ($bn) 27.9 40.3 
Imports ($bn) 30.6 44.6 
Road Network (paved kms 1990) 51469 86000 
Rail network (kms 1990) 23507 36000 
Harbor traffic (mn tons 1991) 104.6 116 
Rail freight (mn tons p.a., 1988-90) 183.4 214 
Note: SADC refers to the 12 member countries of SADC prior to Seychelles and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo joining in September 1997. 
Source: Gelb, NEPAD, p.14. 
While the numbers appear impressive, critics argue the rapid increase was a once 
off, end-of-apartheid splurge. They insist that African states remain economically 
unsound and politically ungovernable. Moreover, the recent flood of South African 
imports and investment in the region has created tension within the SADC community, as 
accusations ofneo-mercantilism poison relations. Combined with South Africa's 
reluctance to provide public goods, such as absorbing immigration and enforcing 
established codes of conduct (i.e. Zimbabwe), some contend South Africa has no 
intention of becoming a regional hegemon. 
However, this view ignores the underlying incentives for regional integration 

















productive labor force the advantages are substantial. While it has diversified its exports 
some over the last decade (See Appendix), it remains an economy based on mineral 
production. By further lowering regional trade barriers and promoting greater regional 
integration, South Africa can create jobs by becoming the beneficiation point for the 
region's primary goods. 
For the other SADC countries, the increased trade and access to crucial foreign 
investment can meet growth requirements that would be unattainable in the domestic pool 
of resources. With the continuous calls for increased investment and trading 
opportunities, it seems illogical for the SAOC community to oppose South Africa's 
economic interest in the region. However, regional governments argue that South Africa 
is merely replicating the inequality of the global economy on a regional basis. 
Some of their points remain valid. There is a tremendous disparity in regional 
trade. In 1999, for example, South African imports from SADC amounted to R2.6 
million and its exports were R 17.7 million. l20 Yet, South Africa appears aware of the 
growing resentment in the region, and the need for more symmetrical growth. As one 
official from the South African Department of Foreign Affairs remarked, "Usually 
diplomats try to find exporting opportunities for their home industries. South Africa must 
be the only country in the world where diplomats [in the country's African missions] try 
to find importing opportunities.,,121 Moreover, within SADC, South Africa has agreed to 
lower its own trade barriers faster than lesser-developed countries. 
It seems clear South Africa has made the decision that deVelopment will come 
collectively for the region if it comes at all. The time and resource investment in NEP AD 
and SADC indicate South Africa's commitment to the African continent. Economically, 
this makes sense. In order to sustain the rapid growth in exports since the end of 
apartheid, South Africa must ensure the health and growth of regional markets. South 
Africa's comparative advantages in infrastructure and skilled-labor, in contrast to the 
region's abundance of relatively cheap, less productive labor, can make trade mutually 
beneficial. Furthennore, regional deVelopment will help to end the collective stereotype 
of an ungovernable continent, and allow for greater participation in the global economy. 
120 South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1001102 (The South Afiican Institute of International 











For South Africa, the challenge remains convincing the other states in the region 
that the rising tide will raise all boats. Wheth{!r growth will be seen as a partnership or 
exploitative hegemonic relationship depends on how carefully South Africa nurtures 
Southern African political relationships (one possible explanation for the passive, 'quiet 
diplomacy' approach to the Zimbabwe crisis) as well as provides for symmetrical 
economic growth. In addition, it must be willing to pay the public goods, such as 
absorbing regional refugees and bankrolling regional security and development programs. 
If done correctly, South Africa's commitment to the regional could end the vicious cycles 
of poverty and finally establish sustainable development in Southern Africa. 
CONCLUSION 
Nine years after the end of apartheid, many in South Africa have begun to ask 
where is the change? The nation continues to have deep divisions along racial and 
economic lines. The government's conservative fiscal and monetary policy must bear 
some of the blame for the half-million jobs that have been lost since the end of apartheid. 
Despite the stifling austerity programs, the country continues to have net outflows of 
much needed foreign direct investment. Where is the change? 
This view fails to properly account for the social, economic and political realities 
that the new government inherited in 1994. The systematic disenfranchisement of over 
eighty percent of the population left massive inequality in the populace, poor 
qualifications in the labor force, structural unemployment, and a bloated central 
government. The economy had been in recession for four consecutive years, the budget 
deficit was almost nine percent, and inflation was at fourteen percent. 
By nearly all accounts, the economy is much healthier than in 1994. Deficits have 
been reduced. The double-digit inflation that ate away growth through the 1980s is 
beginning to come under control. Gold exports have been reduced from 36.1 % of total 
exports to 21.5%, while beneficiated products rose from 23.3% to 27.8%, and 











manufactured products rose from 5.6% to 17%. In 2002, gross fixed capital formation 
grew by almost 8% and manufacturing grew by 5.4% - its fastest growth since 1995. 
The GDP is estimated to have grown 3.1 % in 2002, making South Africa one of 
the best performing countries in the world last year. As President Mbeki reminded the 
country in his State of the Nation Address, 2002 was the tenth consecutive year of 
positive growth, a remarkable achievement considering the international turbulence over 
the last decade. 122 
Moreover, South Africa is doing the right things for continued growth. Education 
investment, cited by new growth theory to be a crucial early indicator oflong-term 
growth, has been consistently over one-fifth of the national budget - one of the highest 
rates in the world. In his 2003 Budget Speech Trevor Manuel reaffirmed this continued 
commitment to education, "Our future is in the hands of our children. Education expands 
abilities and opportunities. It is a great freedom in itself, and opens the doors to other 
freedoms. We recognise this. That is why, at 23,2 per cent of non-interest expenditure, 
investment in education and deepening of the skills base of the economy is our largest 
expenditure area.,,123 
South Africa is just beginning to reap the benefits ofthe difficult fiscal austerity 
and tight monetary policies. Trevor Manuel's 2003 Budget Proposal increases 
government spending by 6.8%, with nearly sixty percent of all non-interest government 
expenses going to health, education, welfare, housing, and other social services. 124 
Government spending will also increase for the crucial job creation segment, building on 
the employment growth recorded in the third quarter of 2002 - the first increase in six 
years. 
While following some of the Washington Consensus formula, South Africa's 
development program is closer to new growth theory than orthodox neoliberalism. The 
government has repeatedly shown it is willing to intervene in the markets to protect 
national interest. The strict capital controls, only liberalized with the 2003 Budget are a 
prime example, in addition to the slow privatization of state assets. Active investment in 
122 Thabo Mbeki, "State of the Nation Address of the President of South Africa," Houses of Parliament, 
Cape Town, February 14,2003. Online, http://www.polity.org.za. 












human capital creation, through training and education, has been at the core of 
government spending. 
Politically, the increased international standing of South Africa and President 
Mbeki has yet to yield measurable results. However, South Africa's prominence in 
nearly all issues surrounding the developing world is confirmed by its continued role in 
various international forums, including President Mbeki' s current role as head of the 
African Union. As NEP AD has shown, South Africa is well positioned to shape the 
development agenda regionally, on the continent, and globally. 
In sum, South Africa's development policies have been a remarkable success. 
The ANC has been able to navigate a successful course between domestic pressures from 
the left (to increase spending irresponsibly) and international pressures from the right (to 
neglect social aspects of development, open capital markets, and sell off state assets more 
rapidly) to establish a secure foundation for a lasting, sustainable development. 











CHAPTER THREE: FROM HERE TO THERE 
I return now to the questions that opened this paper: Why have most countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa not progressed further? What causes countries to develop? What can 
be done? 
The title of this paper, Development Solutions in a Post-Consensus World, is a 
deliberate play on the one enduring theme of developmental economics: the unrelenting 
optimism (hubris?) of researchers and academics in the field. Since the 1950s, 
recommendations have shifted wildly, yet each time proponents wrote that new hope was 
just around the corner. If anything has been learned, it is that there are no 'solutions' to 
the development problems in the cut and paste sense. Yet this is the limited approach that 
too many in the field, especially those with power, maintain. Similarly, as long as the 
World Bank and the IMF cling to these neoliberal policy proscriptions, we are certainly 
not in a post-Consensus world. This paper follows the tradition of development literature 
by maintaining hope, albeit tempered by the mixed record of history and the current 
geopolitical power dynamics. 
My central argument has been that the current development p:rradigm, in that it is 
dictated by the Bretton Woods institutions and unrelentingly follows the Washington 
Consensus proscriptions of macroeconomic discipline, privatization, and liberalization, 
has impeded growth. Rather than serving the developing countries, the current system is 
the product of the World Bank and IMF's successful effort to expand their authority, as 
shown by their power to dictate domestic economic policy to much of the developing 
world. The formula itself is simultaneously too simplistic and too limited. It fails to 
incorporate developments from political economy namely, the need to contextualize 
what in the abstract is the sound economic advice into the larger social and political 











development theory, in which new evidence from country experiences has led to renewed 
emphasis on state involvement in the economy. 
Without entirely disregarding the sound economic principles of the Washington 
Consensus, I suggest six areas of improvement. 
• First, the African community must seize control of development theory and 
policy itself. Policies imposed, or seemingly imposed, from Washington will 
never be as successful as programs that have local ownership. As local 
governments are in a much better position to assess the impact of their actions, 
policies emanating from Africa governments themselves will take better account 
of the social costs of macroeconomic discipline and may adjust accordingly. 
With NEPAD and the AU, this process has already begun, but securing greater 
debt relief and macroeconomic control over domestic economies for African 
states should be a development priority. 
• Accordingly, development policy should follow the recommendations of 
African economists in support of an agricultural led growth. Enhancing 
agricultural productivity by empowering farmers with ownership and technology 
would improve yields. More crucially, ending the hypocritical unilateral 
liberalization of world markets is essential to improve production and expand the 
economic sector that already provides over half of the continent's jobs and a third 
of its productive output. Ending agricultural subsidies in the North should be a 
vital component of any continental economic development effort. 
• A third area for improvement in current development policies is a greater 
emphasis on building national unity and solidifying governments. 
Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa nation states are divided along religious, ethnic, 
and lingual lines. Without a common national purpose, groups and their 
representatives in government pursue destructive policies without regard to the 
future. The proven relationship between social cohesion and economic growth 
supports greater attention to this area. 
• On a similar note, development must have better recognition of the 
institutional surroundings in developing countries. Attention should be given 











Building national unity is one aspect, but the institutions must be more 
comprehensive, everything from mutual respect by individuals to valuing 
education. More tangibly, securing firm property rights and the rule oflaw, 
proven to be two institutions that are definite preconditions for sustainable 
development, should be a focus. 
• A fifth crucial area rests with the international community, which must provide 
better incentives for growth. By continuing to support illegitimate governments 
that have poor policies, international institutions and aid organizations give little 
reason for reform. They must strengthen governments that show a willingness to 
reform and show greater selectivity in administering funds. 
• Lastly, the current Washington Consensus dominated paradigm must 
acknowledge the driving forces of economic growth. In addition to growth 
through agriculture, investments should be made in productivity growth. 
Promoting more spending in education and training, even at the expense of short-
term fiscal discipline, should be encouraged. The evidence from the past thirty 
years shows productivity growth to be far and away the leading cause of 
economic growth. 
In the face of twenty years of economic stagnation throughout Sub-Saharan 
Africa, South Africa's remarkable recovery from apartheid is call for reform. South 
Africa has maintained economic growth for each of the last ten years. The surprisingly 
healthy economy (in light of the realities inherited by the new government in 1994, 
including the lingering unemployment rate of around 30%) seems primed for continued 
success (if it is not derailed by the very real, and significant, threat of HI VIA IDS) and 
more significant growth in the near future. Despite the qualifications and caveats, South 
Africa has given Sub-Saharan Africa its' first large scale successful development 
template to replace the unfulfilled promises of the Washington Consensus. 
Unlike its neighbors, South Africa's policies have originated domestically_ While 
unquestionably using the broad strokes of the Washington Consensus, they have differed 
in essential ways. South Africa was able to dictate the pace and sequencing of 











gradually selling state assets through a privatization program. The government invested 
in both building national unity and enhancing productivity through education and 
training. The government maintained an independent judiciary, strengthened domestic 
institutions and confirmed the absolute rule oflaw from the outset in 1994. 
More fundamentally, South Africa has succeeded because of good governance. 
The ANC used the extraordinary opportunity created by the end of apartheid to take a 
long-term perspective. The unique circumstances allowed the ANC to endure the short-
term political costs associated with Consensus policies. With overwhelming public 
support, unlike any other government on the continent, the ANC could successfully 
implement sound policies without fearing electoral defeat. Moreover, they started with a 
clean slate internationally, allowing them to pace their reforms on their own timetable, 
rather than that of the World Bank or IMF. The result was an enhanced, socially aware 
neoliberal program skillfully piloted between the Schylla and Charybdis of the domestic 
progressive forces in South Africa (pushing for unsustainable increases in social 
spending) and the conservative international forces (pushing for destabilizing 
privatization and capital market liberalization programs). 
Without systematic political reform on the continent, however, no other Sub-
Saharan African country will be follow the template provided by South African. 
Economically, most African countries are locked into debt-cycles and structural 
adjustment programs with the IMF. Politically, most states are relatively weak and 
decentralized. What other government in Africa would be able to absorb the loss of half 
a million jobs and remain confident of reelection the following year? South Africa's 
good governance was only allowed because of its political stability, a luxury not enjoyed 
in many parts of the continent. 
For development to occur, utilizing the strategies written above, reform-minded 
governments must be given the capacity to enact change. South Africa's advocacy of 
NEPAD and the AU, by establishing the regional and continental support structures for 
reform, is crucial to this process but more work must be done. 
Moving forward, more research is needed on how to identifY and then empower 
reform-minded governments. Developing institutions, building national unity, aligning 











policies, but they remain predicated on governments having the capacity for reforms. 
Development theory has progressed from viewing markets as isolated from their political 
and societal contexts to seeing markets as embedded in larger structures, but now it must 
focus more on the nature of governance itself in developing countries. What is the nature 
of political authority in developing countries? How are domestic institutions 
strengthened? How can stable, reform-oriented governments develop from fragmented 
societies? 
These questions should be part of the continued effort to find better solutions for 
development. With implications ranging from eliminating poverty and enhancing 
opportunities for millions, to increasing global security and prosperity, it is not an 
overstatement to say the future depends on better strategies for economic development. 
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Appendix B: Mineral Reserves and Export Diversification 


















Source: Pieter Laubscher, "South Africa's Manufacturing Exports: Recent Market Trends," 
Trade and Industry Monitor4 (December 1997); 2. As quoted in Francis Wilson, 
Minerals and Migrants, p117. 
South Africa's Mineral Reserves and Production, 1997 
Mineral Percent of World Production World Rank 
Alumino Silicates 61 1 
Chrome Ore 46 1 
Ferrochromium 45 1 
Gold 20 1 
Platinum Group Metals 47 1 
Vanadium 57 1 
Vermiculite 44 1 
Titanium Minerals 24 2 
Zirconium Minerals 29 2 
Ferromananese 12 3 
Fluorspar 5 3 
Manganese Ore 15 3 
Antimony 3 4 
Coal 6 5 
Diamonds 9 5 
Fmosilicon 4 6 
Silicon Metal 4 7 
Aluminum 3 8 
Iron Ore 3 8 
Lead 3 8 
Nickel 3 8 
Uranium 4 8 
Asbestos 2 9 
Phosphate Rock 2 9 
Copper 2 12 
Silver 1 15 
Zinc 1 17 
Source: South African Yearbook 1999 (Pretoria: Government Communication and Information 
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